As outgoing secretary of the Air Force in the Biden administration, I had the opportunity to make that decision but I chose to defer it until after the presidential election. Why? At first glance, the decision to ensure the U.S. Air Force has the most capable manned fighter in the world doesn’t seem to be a tough call.

But Congress needs to look beyond the obvious appeal of this advanced aircraft and ask the Trump administration some hard questions: Is this the right airplane for our defense strategy? Is it affordable? Does it displace higher priorities? I deferred the NGAD decision because I didn’t have those answers before I left the Department of the Air Force — and it’s unclear whether the Trump administration has them now.

I started the NGAD program in 2015, when I was under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and Logistics. At the time, I launched the Aerospace Innovation Initiative, or AII, to build experimental prototypes, known as X-planes, that would develop and test high-risk and high-payoff technologies for the next generation of fighters after the F-35, while also supporting competition and maintaining cutting-edge aircraft design teams in the defense industrial base. This program successfully produced the technologies that are the basis for the designs that competed to become the F-47.

Following AII’s success, the Air Force moved on to developing more detailed tactical designs with all the features and subsystems required to support the Air Force’s chosen mission. When I returned to the Pentagon as Secretary of the Air Force in 2021, I found that the Air Force had decided to pursue a follow-on to the F-22, a fighter designed for manned Penetrating Counter Air, or PCA, missions. Such missions involve flying deep into enemy airspace and fighting against robust, state-of-the-art defenses. The PCA emphasis brought with it significant costs — tens of billions for development and hundreds of millions per aircraft for production. These expenses limit the potential aircraft inventory to small numbers. We currently have fewer than 200 F-22s. These airplanes are precious, and we can’t tolerate high losses in this fleet.

We don’t know what conflicts or warfighting scenarios will drive the Trump administration’s defense investments. PCA designs are based on the need to take the air superiority fight deep into heavily defended enemy territory, but we have to ask: Is this a sound planning scenario for nuclear powers like China or Russia? If the Trump administration’s strategy emphasizes homeland security and defensive scenarios, wouldn’t a lower cost design more focused on Defensive Counter-Air, or DCA, make more sense? Would a multirole next-generation design, like the F-35, make more sense? Would an aircraft designed to work with uncrewed tactical aircraft, like the Air Force uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft, make more sense? The decision to buy the F-47 needs to be the right choice for the future — this is the only new crewed fighter aircraft the Air Force will likely pursue for a long time.

Just before I left office, I authored a report for Congress on the Department of the Air Force that the U.S. would need in 2050. I discussed the strategic environment we could expect at that time and what the Air Force and Space Force would need to do to prepare. I predicted a transition to reliance on uncrewed aircraft that would most likely be controlled by crewed aircraft designed for that purpose, providing superior capabilities and putting fewer pilots at risk. The F-47 will be able to control uncrewed aircraft, but it isn’t optimized for that function. Congress needs to ensure that the Trump administration has considered the relationship between the F-47, the Trump defense strategy and the overall future of the Air Force.

Moreover, whether the F-47 will fit into the Trump administration’s 2026 budget and future years program remains an open question. When the Air Force created its first draft 2026 budget and five-year program in 2024, we concluded we couldn’t afford NGAD no matter how capable and relevant it was. Congress needs to ask what has changed since then.

Over the next five years, the F-47 program will require tens of billions of dollars in additional funding. At this point, with all the other demands on the Air Force budget, including recapitalizing two legs of the nuclear triad, it’s unclear whether this administration — or the next — will be able to continue this program. Congress should demand to see the affordability analysis the Trump administration should have completed before awarding the contract.

Congress should also consider whether the Trump administration’s future year defense plan and budget will prioritize higher priority investments than the F-47. When I left the Pentagon, the Department of the Air Force had a list of unfunded strategic priorities that were higher priority than NGAD. At the top of the list were counter-space weapons and airbase defense. Neither of these is a direct Air Force responsibility, but both are critical to the success of the entire Joint Force. China is well on its way to fielding robust space-based targeting systems that threaten all of our land- and sea-based forces. We must acquire counter-space systems at scale or China will be able to target all of our assets at sea and on the ground with impunity and in real time. China also has an ever-expanding arsenal of sophisticated weapons ready to strike our airbases in the Pacific. Those bases are limited in numbers, not well defended and each is subject to attack by literally hundreds of missiles of all types. Our new F-47s — and all of our forward-based aircraft — will never get off the ground if we don’t address these threats through substantial budget increases.

Congress must demand that the Trump administration provide a national defense strategy with the 2026 budget and explain how the F-47 supports that strategy. The administration also needs to show the F-47 is affordable and that it hasn’t come at the expense of higher priority needs. Congress must ensure that the Trump administration provides the needed support for the F-47 decision. Until then, the jury is still out on whether the F-47 contract should have been awarded.

Frank Kendall served as the Secretary of the Air Force during the Biden administration.

Unlike during Trump’s first term in office, however, this time Europe has recognized the dramatic nature of the situation and developed ideas to strengthen the British and French nuclear deterrent. Both European nuclear powers want to intensify their nuclear consultations and, in addition, French President Emmanuelle Macron has once again called for a dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear states in Europe.

Germany is open to such a dialogue. The German British Defence Agreement (Trinity House), concluded in autumn 2024, already explicitly provides for an exchange on nuclear issues.

Friedrich Merz, Germany’s designated chancellor, also spoke out in favor of the nuclear dialogue proposed by Macron at an early stage. The idea of such talks is to send a signal of commitment and determination not only to Moscow, but also to Washington.

This is not (yet) about replacing the American “extended deterrent” with a European version as it is far from certain that Washington will close the nuclear umbrella over Europe, especially as the damage to the USA itself would be considerable.

The goal of nuclear non-proliferation, which America has always pursued, would be jeopardized and new nuclear states could emerge in Eastern Europe or Asia, for example.

However, the Trump administration is not known for taking the negative consequences of its own impulsive actions into account in advance.

What could Germany bring to such talks, and what would be its contribution to strengthening a European nuclear deterrent?

There’s certainly nothing along the lines of Germany attempting to develop its own nuclear weapons. Germany has repeatedly and formally renounced this option and, apart from a few academics, there is no politically serious voice in Berlin that would want to change this – not to mention the enormous costs of such a project.

Even the conceivable possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons on German soil – similar to the U.S. nuclear bombs in deployed in Germany – is currently only a theoretical one.

Paris has not yet abandoned its long-standing skepticism towards the idea of a nuclear umbrella for non-nuclear allies and sees nuclear weapons as a strictly national matter.

Furthermore, France only has around 40 nuclear cruise missiles and the same number of land-based, nuclear-capable Rafale fighter-bombers. The rest of the approximately 290 French nuclear warheads are intended for use at sea – either from submarines or with Rafale bombers from the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle.”

The British nuclear arsenal is stationed exclusively on submarines.

What Germany can offer London and Paris, however, is to contribute to the considerable costs of both countries’ nuclear capabilities.

Back in May 2017, the Scientific Service of the German Parliament analyzed the co-financing of foreign nuclear weapons potentials from the federal budget in a publicly accessible report.

This assessment was commissioned by parliamentarians because the question of the reliability of the American nuclear commitments had already arisen during President Trump’s first term in office.

The report concluded that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been binding for Germany since 1975, does not contain a ban on support or funding from non-nuclear states for nuclear powers. Nor can such a ban be derived from the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, in which Germany’s non-nuclear status is enshrined, or from general international law.

Only some international treaties on “nuclear-weapon-free zones” contain indirect prohibitions on assistance. However, Germany is not a party to such treaties.

Apparently, Germany has not yet provided such nuclear co-financing, even though there were occasional rumors that the Federal Republic had provided financial support for the development of Israel’s nuclear weapons potential in the 1950s and 1960s. However, such rumors have never been substantiated.

What follows from all this is that financial support for British or French nuclear deterrence is possible in principle. Of course, this would only take place if a direct link were established between the nuclear weapons potential of both countries and the security of Germany and Europe.

The corresponding benefits and counter-benefits would have to be set out in legally binding bilateral agreements. It is worth noting that the German Federal Ministry of Finance has already created a branch called “Geo-Economics and Security Policy” in order to assess the various financial implications of the new security challenges – this branch could conceptually assess the implications of such an agreement.

If Germany were to include such an option in the planned dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear states, the talks would immediately be elevated to a politically concrete and presumably mutually beneficial level. It would also be an example of a strategically forward-looking German security policy – something that has not often been the case in Berlin in the past.

Karl-Heinz Kamp is an associate fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations and was president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy.

The 8% relook will let senior officials imprint their preferences on the Defense Department budget. Although the relook could unfold in many ways, officials likely will use it to improve the U.S. military position relative to China. The question is, what specific adds and cuts would advance that goal, and what can leaders do to make those choices stick?

In January, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments conducted an exercise to assess how the new administration should adjust defense spending to meet the China challenge. Participants joined from across the U.S. government, defense industry and think tank community. They wrestled with what to fund based on different strategies for stopping a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and different trajectories for defense budgets.

In a forthcoming report on the exercise, we argue that defense investments currently fall into four categories. Each category requires different moves by Defense Department civilian leaders. If they make those moves effectively, then the relook can succeed at breaking through bureaucratic barriers and reinforcing the U.S. military’s ability to deter or, if necessary, defeat China.

Uncertainty is the only constant in the Pentagon’s budget outlook

First are top priority investments. Exercise participants added money for these capabilities regardless of military strategy or budget size. These programs deserve the first claim on available resources. They included munitions, the B-21 bomber, space systems, collaborative combat aircraft, Virginia-class submarines, counter-small unmanned aircraft system initiatives, aerial refueling tankers, air and sea autonomous systems, Indo-Pacific military construction and the defense industrial base. Many of these capabilities also appeared on the secretary’s list. The relook thus appears to be largely on the right track in terms of identifying key items.

Top priority investments require Pentagon leaders to be protectors. Several of these capabilities, most notably munitions, are orphans. Historically, they have lacked the organizational, political and industry support needed to thrive in the Pentagon’s heartless bureaucracy. If leaders do not adopt them, they will not get the funding they deserve.

Second are strategy-dependent investments. Participants boosted funding for these capabilities only under one military strategy. Our exercise considered two: Prompt denial would aim to rapidly defeat Chinese invasion forces en route to Taiwan, whereas protracted defeat would aim to deny China control of Taiwan over a longer period. Strategy-dependent investments included homeland missile defense, cybersecurity and support ships, which were all viewed as more essential for protracted defeat.

Strategy-dependent investments require Pentagon leaders to be technicians. They must reach into arcane military plans and compel organizations to prepare to fight (and budget) in ways consistent with political leaders’ objectives. If they do not, then they may find the cupboard to be unexpectedly bare when conflict erupts.

Third are resource-dependent investments. Participants cut these capabilities under tight budgets but maintained or increased them when given at least 2% real growth in annual spending. Resource-dependent investments included nuclear modernization, amphibious vessels, aircraft carriers, surface combatants, readiness and sixth-generation fighters.

Resource-dependent investments require Pentagon leaders to be pragmatists. Not everything will fit in the budget. However, items of great importance can be squeezed in if the overall budget is larger. Leaders must draw these two lines (what is in or out, and at what size budget) sharply to survive scrutiny from the White House and Congress.

Fourth are bottom priority investments. Participants cut funds for these capabilities across all strategy and spending scenarios. These programs deserve the last claim on available resources. Bottom priority investments included fourth-generation fighters, ground forces, Defense Department civilians and contractors, the Littoral Combat Ship and the A-10.

Bottom priority investments require Pentagon leaders to be disciplinarians. Cutting spending on them will not be easy. For instance, Congress has increased aircraft and ship procurement funding more than any other Defense Department budget area since 2016. It often blocks proposals to retire older platforms. To win Capitol Hill acceptance of cuts, leaders will need the kind of grit that Robert Gates exhibited when he forced through major weapons reductions 15 years ago.

The 8% relook offers an opportunity to break the defense budgeting routine, but that outcome is far from preordained. Incrementalism largely prevailed during the first Trump administration, despite exaggerated claims to the contrary. The defense policy status quo remains highly resistant to change. We will see if the second Trump administration can make a dent.

Travis Sharp is a senior fellow and director of the defense budget studies program at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Casey Nicastro is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Evan Braden Montgomery is the director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Today, the stakes are also critical. The global security environment is undergoing seismic shifts, with threats evolving at a speed and scale unseen since the Cold War. Yet, unlike the industrial mobilization of the past, the modern battlefield is defined not only by hardware but also by the ability to leverage software–systems capable of adapting at speed and precision, processing vast amounts of data and enabling real-time decision-making.

To meet today’s challenges, the U.S. must modernize its industrial base and embrace a new approach to software: software-defined warfare (SDW). By prioritizing software as a core enabler of military capability, the Defense Department can enhance its ability to adapt, improve interoperability and ensure its continued technological edge in the face of rapid advancement.

This vision is central to the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, which has convened leaders from government, industry and academia to identify actionable steps for modernizing the U.S. defense enterprise. The commission’s recommendations emphasize the urgent need to integrate software across all domains of warfare, streamline acquisition processes and cultivate a workforce capable of advancing this transformation.

The path forward: Data and commercial software

A simple truth lies at the heart of software-defined warfare: the ability to collect, process and act on data faster than the adversary is critical to prevailing in future conflicts. Yet, the DOD lacks a unified, scalable approach to managing its vast data resources.

To address this, the commission recommends mandating the creation of an enterprise data repository and investing in artificial intelligence enablers. A centralized repository would ensure that critical data — collected from a wide variety of platforms — is accessible, organized and prepared for multiple uses. By pairing this repository with AI-ready tools, including machine learning models and enterprise machine learning operations (MLOps) platforms, DOD can empower decision-makers with actionable insights in real-time.

Equally critical is the need to shift from bespoke software development to leveraging proven commercial software solutions. Despite statutory guidance that prioritizes commercial acquisitions, DOD often defaults to custom-built systems, resulting in higher costs, longer timelines and reduced flexibility. The commission calls for commercial software to become the default approach, with clear checkpoints to ensure that acquisition decisions align with this priority.

Adopting commercial software enables the rapid integration of cutting-edge innovations already tested in the private sector. It reduces duplication and waste, as commercial solutions can be scaled across multiple use cases. It also ensures software systems can be continuously updated, keeping pace with the rapid tempo of technological change.

By focusing on these two areas — data management and commercial software acquisition — DOD can achieve near-term gains while laying the groundwork for long-term success.

Transforming DOD into a much more software-centric organization also requires investment in human capital. The development of a skilled and sustainable workforce is essential to realizing the promise of SDW. DOD must expand training programs to equip personnel with the skills needed to operate and innovate in a software-driven environment. Partnerships with academia and industry can help build pipelines of technical talent while recruiting software engineers into key roles will ensure DOD can leverage cutting-edge expertise.

Yet, SDW is not just a domestic initiative; it is a strategic imperative that must be pursued in partnership with allies who are making similar investments. Interoperability across allied systems and collaborative innovation will be critical to countering adversarial advances. By fostering joint development and experimentation, the U.S. and its partners can create a unified front capable of meeting global security challenges.

The challenges are immense, but the solutions are within reach. As the global security landscape grows more complex, the U.S. cannot afford to rely on outdated processes and legacy systems. Software-defined warfare provides a clear path to modernize and reimagine America’s defense capabilities for the 21st century.

The commission has outlined a roadmap built on three pillars: technology, processes and people. By focusing on data and commercial software as foundational priorities, DOD can achieve the agility, adaptability, and resilience necessary to maintain its strategic advantage.

America’s arsenal of democracy must be reimagined for the digital age. This is not a matter of preference but of necessity. The stakes could not be higher, and the time to act is now.

Dr. Mung Chiang is president of Purdue University and co-chair of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Mark Esper, the 27th secretary of defense, is board director of the Atlantic Council and a co-chair of its Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Christine Fox, former acting deputy secretary of defense, is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University Applied Research Laboratory and co-chair of the council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare.

Although discussions surrounding the act are focusing on its effect on immigration, what is often getting lost in debates is the White House’s argument that drug trafficking constitutes a form of irregular warfare. Similarly, the administration has stirred up controversy by classifying drug traffickers as terrorists.

Can it be the case that drug traffickers are terrorists carrying out a form of irregular warfare — and if so, how could the U.S. military address this at a strategic level?

Can drugs be weapons of war?

The word “terrorism” has taken on new meaning in recent years. Although arguments can be made as to what signifies a terrorist activity, the concept of terrorism is most often associated with those who choose to do harm against civilians through acts of extreme violence or by mass casualty.

The attacks on the USS Cole, the World Trade Center and Benghazi usually come to mind when referring to acts of terrorism. Yet it is the subtle terrorist attacks that often go unnoticed.

The correlation between drugs and terrorist organizations is not new. In fact, most terrorist organizations rely heavily on criminal conduct to support their activities, such as the illicit drug trade, human trafficking, sex trafficking and money laundering. While it is true that illegal drugs finance terrorist and criminal groups, the situation today has changed.

It has become well known that the primary killer of U.S. adults between the ages of 18 and 45 is fentanyl. In 2019 it was reported that fentanyl death rates had risen by over 1,000% within just six years.

Unlike in the past, when the goal of illicit drug trade was to increase profits to fund terrorist attacks, fentanyl not only increases criminal profits but is a means of destruction — harming a large portion of the U.S. population and causing over 100,000 deaths per year. Mexican cartels have been identified as being responsible for the influx of fentanyl into the U.S., which led Trump to designate them as terrorist organizations.

Can drugs like fentanyl accurately be described as weapons of war? Although it may seem surprising, history shows us the answer is often yes.

Organized crime groups have often deliberately flooded drugs into the U.S. with the goal of inflicting mass casualties on civilians. In 2005, Afghan drug lord Haji Baz Mohammed was extradited to the U.S. and convicted after having orchestrated attempts to use heroin as a form of “jihad,” stating that he and his colleagues were “taking the Americans’ money and the heroin was killing them,” according to court documents.

State actors and corruption

Political entities wishing to undermine the United States often have deep ties to the drug trade and use it to cause harm. One example is the conviction and sentencing of Juan Orlando Hernandez, who served as president of Honduras from 2014 to 2022, and was eventually sentenced to 45 years in prison in June 2024 for what U.S. prosecutors described as “state-sponsored drug trafficking.”

The case made history as Hernandez became the first former president sentenced in the U.S. for narcotics trafficking. According to the Justice Department, Hernandez’s co-conspirators benefited not only from political protection but military-style weaponry, including AK-47s, AR-15s and grenade launchers.

Mexico presents a unique challenge in terms of its geographic proximity to the U.S. and its role as a major international trading partner. Due to deep corruption, it has proved problematic in the past for U.S. law enforcement to put a stop to cartel activities affecting American citizens.

Recently, the Mexican government extradited 29 drug lords to the U.S., including Rafael Caro Quintero, a Sinaloa cartel leader responsible for the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in 1985. Camarena was kidnapped, brutally tortured and killed at the hands of the Sinaloa cartel in one of many tragedies experienced by the DEA while it was operating in Mexico for over 40 years.

Quintero evaded justice for decades, a demonstration of the the difficulties of taking on cartels as well as the problem corruption has posed in stifling their illicit activities.

To take on the cartels who are responsible for the deaths of American civilians will take more than military or law enforcement action alone.

The need for joint solutions

While turning its attention to Mexico, the current administration has deployed U.S. military forces to establish control of the border. However, such efforts will require combined experience, knowledge and the integration of expertise beyond the armed forces.

Since the illicit drug trade is a major activity for the Mexican cartels, the model for a solution can be replicated based on the Afghanistan-based partnership between the Defense Department and a foreign-deployed advisory support team, or FAST.

This highly successful joint effort saw the U.S. military work with DEA agents on the ground to target Taliban heroin traffickers. What brought success then was options and the ability to target narco-terrorists through an array of authorities that could be used on the battlefield.

The same concept could be used to address the threats from Mexico by exploiting DOD assets and combining them with DEA expertise. Alongside vetted Mexican authorities, this partnership would yield shared intelligence gathering, training and joint operations.

FAST drew its methodologies from U.S. special operations by merging small unit tactics, operational planning and tactical combat casualty care with DEA’s investigative techniques, evidence processing and handling of informants to create an unprecedented approach to effectively extinguish threats from criminal groups.

In a few short years, FAST became a valuable resource for the Special Operations Command to target Taliban principals and remove terrorist leaders from the battlefield. It remains a partnership highly valued by those who served on DEA’s FAST program.

Although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have since ended, the lessons learned from this cooperative approach still hold value. This strategy may be revisited as a method of unconventional warfare aimed at dismantling the most nefarious criminal organizations.

Neither the U.S. military nor federal law enforcement acting alone are enough to deal with the complex problem of cartels. Forging a new partnership between DOD and DEA using the FAST model could prove to be the most efficient solution.

While Washington dithered and denied MacArthur’s pleas to be allowed to bomb the Chinese buildup on the Yalu River, the Chinese measured the U.S. response and set a trap.

As winter conditions set in, nearly a half-million Chinese soldiers swarmed across the mountains as U.S. air power was politically restricted from crossing the Chinese border to destroy rear area logistics or even bomb the essential Yalu River bridges.

With vast human-wave assaults, the Chinese drove U.S. and U.N. forces all the way past the 38th parallel and overran the South Korean capital of Seoul. It took another two and a half years to regain the 38th parallel and conclude an armistice. And we are still there.

Those “probing attacks” foreshadowed Communist China’s decision to launch a war with the U.S. using all the military power at its disposal and doing it in the only place in which it could operate at the time — the Korean Peninsula.

Today, the U.S. may be in a similar situation, but the stakes are much greater: The relative power and strategic reach of China are orders of magnitude beyond what was available to them 75 years ago, allowing the country to now reach across the Pacific to our very shores.

While President Donald Trump is making a high-intensity push to bolster U.S. national security — with everything from the F-47 and the B-21 Raider to the promise of a “Golden Dome” aerospace defense system — these systems are not yet operational. The fact remains that China has steadily been increasing its offensive power under President Xi Jinping.

Just last week, the Chinese military released a propaganda video of its growing naval might. This followed last month’s large-scale jaunt into the Tasman Sea by the People’s Liberation Army Navy, much to the discomfort of our allies Australia and New Zealand.

Last week, China’s Coast Guard continued to challenge the Philippine Coast Guard, while last summer it blockaded a Philippine shoal outpost, detained a Taiwanese fishing boat and its crew, aggressively prowled an uninhabited Japanese island chain and flagrantly violated Taiwan’s air and sea space.

Much like the Chinese of 1950 massing in the hills above the Yalu with China’s probes ignored by Washington, so, too, are the contemporaneous, widespread actions of the Chinese across the breadth of the western Pacific being left partially unaddressed in the midst of the Trump administration’s nascent DOGE reformation of the entirety of the U.S. government.

Remember in 2013, Xi announced, “Western constitutional government, universal values, civil societies and journalism are false ideological trends.” Xi also asserted that China will be No. 1 in the world militarily and economically by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In other words, China will be the world’s new hegemon. Xi continues to strengthen his authoritarian rule and use Chinese military power to make his ideas stick.

In 2023, Xi detailed the need for China to meet world-class military standards by 2027, the 100th anniversary of the pre-war founding of the People’s Liberation Army. Xi also spoke of “informatization” (i.e., artificial intelligence) to accelerate building the world’s most powerful, ultra-modern military force.

In light of the posture assumed by Xi, we believe that it could lead in the longer term to war directly against the homeland of the United States, as we have delineated in our website Winning Peer Wars.

Xi’s longer-term objectives are clear, but that does not preclude a variety of opportunistic short-term moves.

Such moves, just short of a war with the U.S., could include taking and holding parts of Pacific shoals and islands now under contention and vigorously supplying Russia with military hardware. Or, China could provide troops for non-combat duties to free Russian soldiers for the Ukrainian War.

There is also the distant possibility of encouraging the estimated 50,000-plus Chinese males of military age illegally in the U.S. to participate in low-level attacks, such as throwing railway switches, disturbing pipelines and affecting electric transformers across the country.

In an effort to map U.S. weakness in the near term, while maintaining deniability, Xi could engage in nuisance cyber attacks at will.

The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party held a hearing earlier this month that exposed the depth of the current Chinese cybersecurity threat against the U.S. The overall outcome was alarming, not because of the obvious Chinese capabilities and long-running hacking operations, but because of the lackluster U.S. cyber defense worsened by government departments which are stovepiped, thus making it difficult for the U.S. to appreciate the broad systemic impact of the Chinese threat.

The U.S. myopia in the understanding of the larger Chinese threat is complicated by the ongoing DOGE reformation, leaving the U.S. unprepared for the reality of 21st century warfare with a peer competitor bent on war by strategic paralysis — the same strategic paralysis as put forth in the seminal work on Chinese strategic goals and methods, “Unrestricted Warfare.”

The book was written in 1999 by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, then colonels in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. It laid out a decades-long plan of creeping, slow-motion warfare against U.S. diplomatic, informational, military and economic strengths until China would be strong enough to take on the country in a peer-to-peer conflict.

In retrospect, “Unrestricted Warfare” is exactly what China has been doing during the last quarter century, and what Xi intends to finish by 2049 — or perhaps years or decades before that date.

And while we have laid out plans at Winning Peer Wars to effectively counter Xi’s plans in the long term, here’s what we recommend for the next few months:

1. Increase reconnaissance efforts by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to maximum effort immediately.
2. Immediately declassify sensitive intelligence of Chinese military operations and pass to open sources.
3. Open U.S. ships, aircraft and bases to the world media to ensure massive coverage in the Indo-Pacific theater, whose vast distances preclude such coverage.
4. Make significant U.S. Air Force and Navy visits to the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam and other friendly countries.

With luck, such actions might hold Xi in check and would tend to slow any Chinese march toward war.

Chuck de Caro was an IW researcher for the late Andrew W. Marshall, director OSD/Net Assessment; de Caro is the progenitor of the world’s first virtual military organization, the 1st Joint SOFTWAR Unit (Virtual).

John Warden is a retired Air Force colonel who served from 1965 to 1995, with tours to Vietnam, Germany, Spain, Italy and Korea, among other CONUS-based assignments. Warden served a number of roles at the Pentagon, was special assistant for policy studies and national security affairs to the vice president and was commandant of the Air Command and Staff College.

Such a doctrine should take shape along four approaches: Polluting large language models for negative effects; using Conway’s Law for guidance to exploitable flaws; exploiting bias of adversary leadership to degrade AI systems; and using RF Weapons to cascade AI supporting computer hardware.

These systems might seem on their face to be insurmountable. Well, maybe not. As Mark Twain said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”

Thus, perhaps a look into the past will help envision the future.

Polluting large language models to create negative effects

Generative AI can be expressed as the extraction of statistical patterns from an extremely large data set. It is important to understand that a large language model, or LLM, developed from such a data set using “Transformer” technology allows a user to access it via a “prompt” — a natural language text that describes the function which the AI must perform. The end result is a generative pre-trained, or GPT, large language model.

Thus, there are at least two approaches to degrade such an AI system: Pollute data or attack “Prompt Engineering” — a term of art within the AI community describing the process of structuring instructions that can be understood by the generative AI system. A programming error, as noted below, will cause the AI LLM system, in another AI term of art, to “Hallucinate.”

A historical analogy from World War II validates the crucial importance of countermeasures when an enemy has unilateral access to information about the battlespace.

The development of RADAR — Radio Azimuth Detecting And Ranging — was, in itself, a method of extracting patterns from an extremely large database. In the vastness of the sky, an echo from a radio pulse gave an accurate range and bearing of unseen aircraft.

To defeat it, as described by R.V. Jones in Most Secret War, it was necessary to put information into the German radar system, thus causing gross ambiguity. Jones turned to a physicist at the Technical Research Establishment, Joan Curran, who developed the optimum size and shape of aluminum foil strips — called “Window” by the Brits and “Chaff” by the Americans — used to create thousands of reflections which overloaded and blinded German radars.

In much the same way, the U.S. military and intelligence communities can create ambiguities and obscurations within generative AI systems, especially when trying to deny access to information about weapons and tactics.

This can be done by assigning names to said weapons and tactics, designed to be both ambiguous and non sequitur. For example, such “naturally occurring” search ambiguities include the following:

• A search for “Flying Prostitute” reveals data about the B-26 Marauder medium bomber of World War II.
• “Gilda” and “Atoll” retrieves a photo of the Mark III nuclear bomb that was dropped on Bikini Atoll in 1946, upon which was pasted a photo of Rita Hayworth.
• “Tonopah” and “Goatsucker” retrieves the F-117 stealth fighter.

Since a contemporary computer search is easily fooled, it would be possible to grossly skew results of an LLM function by deliberately using nomenclature which occurs in very large iterations and is extremely ambiguous.

Perhaps the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter could, in such an attempt, be renamed something like “Stormy Daniels.” One can imagine the consternation Chinese officers and NCOs would experience when their young soldiers expend valuable time meticulously examining images that have no relation to the desired search.

Even “Air Gapped” systems like those being used by U.S. intelligence agencies can be affected when systems update information from online sources.

Such an effort must actively and continuously pollute data sets, much like chaff confusing a RADAR system, by generating content that would populate the model and force the adversary to consume it.

A more sophisticated approach would use key words like “eBay” or “Amazon” as a predicate, and then common words like “Tire” or “Bicycle” or “Shoe.” Contracting with a commercial media agency to promote the “items” across traditional and social media would tend to clog a Large Language Model.

Using Conway’s Law for guidance to exploitable flaws

Melvin Conway is an American computer scientist, who, in the 1960s, conceived the eponymous rule stating: “Organizations which design systems are constrained to produce designs which are copies of the communication structures of these organizations.”

In response, de Caro’s Corollary states: “The more dogmatic the design team, the greater the opportunity to sabotage the whole design.”

Consider Google Gemini. The February 2024 launch of Google’s would-be answer to ChatGPT was an unmitigated disaster that dumped Google’s share price and left the company a laughingstock. As the Gemini launch went forward, its image generator “Hallucinated” — and created images of Black Nazi soldiers and female Asian Popes.

In retrospect, the event was the most egregious example of what happens when Conway’s Law collides with organizational dogma. Historically ignorant programmers myopically led their company into a debacle.

But, for those interested in confounding China’s AI systems, the Gemini disaster is an epiphany!

If the programmers at the “Googleplex” campus in Mountain View, California, can screw up so immensely, what kind of swirling vortex of programming snafu is being created by the indoctrinated young members of the People’s Liberation Army who work on AI?

A solution to beating China’s AI systems may be an epistemologist who specializes in the cultural communication of the PLA. By using de Caro’s Corollary, such an expert could lead a team of computer scientists to replicate the Chinese communication norms and find the weaknesses in their system — leaving it open to spoofing or outright collapse.

It also should be noted that when a technology creates an existential threat, the individual developers of that technology become strategic targets. For example, in 1943, Operation Hydra utilized the entirety of the RAF British Bomber Command of 596 bombers, with the stated mission of killing German rocket scientists at Peenemunde. The RAF had marginal success and was followed by three U.S. 8th Air Force raids in July and August of 1944.

In 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) dispatched multi-lingual agent and polymath Mo Berg to assassinate German scientist Werner Heisenberg, if Heisenberg seemed to be on the right path to build an atomic bomb. Berg decided, correctly, that the German was off track, and letting him live would keep the Nazis from any success.

It is also no secret that five Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated — allegedly — by the Israelis in the last decade. Advances in AI that could become existential threats may be dealt with in similar fashion.

Exploiting bias of adversary leadership to degrade AI systems

Often, entities funding research and development skew results because of bias. For example, aforementioned German scientist Werner Heisenberg was limited in the paths he might follow toward a Nazi A-Bomb because of Hitler’s perverse hatred of “Jewish Physics.”

This attitude was aided and abetted by two prominent and antisemitic German scientists, Phillip Lenard and Johannes Stark, both Nobel Prize winners who reinforced the myth of “Aryan Science.” The end result effectively prevented a successful German nuclear program.

Again, there is epiphany here: Bias from the top affects outcomes.

As Xi Jinping continues his move toward authoritarian rule under himself, he brings his biases with him. This eventually will affect, or infect, Chinese military power.

In 2023, Xi detailed the need for China to meet world class military standards by 2027, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army. Xi also spoke of “informatization” (read AI) to accelerate building “a strong system of strong strategic forces, raise the presence of combat forces in new domains and of new qualities and promote combat oriented military training.”

It seems that Xi’s need for speed, especially in “informatization,” might be the bias that indicates a weakness that can be exploited.

Using gyrotrons to cascade chips in computers supporting AI

Artificial Intelligence is dependent on extremely fast computer chips whose capacities are approaching their physical limits. They are more vulnerable to lack of cooling and electromagnetic pulse.

In the case of large, Cloud-based data centers, cooling is an absolute necessity. Water cooling is the most economical and therefore the most prevalent; but pumps, backup pumps and inlet valves usually are not hardened, and thus are extremely vulnerable. No pumps, no water. No water, no cooling. No cooling, no Cloud.

The same for primary and secondary electrical power. No power, no Cloud. No generators, no Cloud. No fuel, no Cloud.

Autonomous airborne drones or ground mobile vehicles are moving targets — small and hard to hit. However, their chips are vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse. We now know that a lightning bolt with gigawatts of power isn’t the only way to knock out an AI robot. High-Power Microwave Systems such as Epirus, Leonidas and Thor can burn out AI systems at a range of about three miles.

An interesting technology not yet fielded is the gyrotron. It is a Cold War era Soviet-developed, high-power microwave source, halfway between a klystron and a free electron laser. It creates a cyclotron resonance in a strong magnetic field that can produce a customized energy bolt with a specific pulse width and amplitude. Theoretically, it could reach out and disable a specific chip, at greater ranges than a “You fly ‘em, We fry ‘em” high power microwave weapon now in early test stage.

Obviously, without functioning chips, AI doesn’t work.

The headlong Chinese AI development initiative could provide the PLA with an extraordinary military advantage in terms of the speed and sophistication of a future attack upon the homeland of the United States.

Thus, the need to develop AI counter measures — now — is paramount.

In World War I, the great Italian progenitor of airpower, General Giulio Douhet, very wisely stated, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”

In terms of the threat posed by Artificial Intelligence as it applies to warfare, Douhet’s words could not be truer today.

Chuck de Caro was an IW researcher for the late Andrew W. Marshall, director OSD/Net Assessment; de Caro is the progenitor of the world’s first virtual military organization, the 1st Joint SOFTWAR Unit (Virtual).

The Army continues to rely on archaic administrative remedies, as obesity, a chronic disease recognized by the American Medical Association, is tightening its grip on our ranks. The Army’s approach has long been punitive rather than science-based interventions, often forcing soldiers into maladaptive behaviors like extreme dieting, dehydration, disordered eating and weight cycling. These shortcuts don’t build warfighters; they break them.

Obesity, at its core, is defined as excess body fat measured through reliable methods. One of the most commonly used screening tools is body mass index (BMI), yet its validity is often questioned. The Army’s primary screening tool, the height and weight tables in AR 600-9, is rooted in BMI. Soldiers who exceed these limits undergo body fat assessment via the tape test. In 2023, the Army updated the tape test after an extensive evaluation of body composition tools, incorporating the latest science to improve accuracy (the science of which was recently published).

So why isn’t the tape test applied universally? Eliminating the height and weight screening and mandating a circumference-based screening for all soldiers would allow us to better assess those at real risk for obesity-related health and performance issues before they fall through the cracks.

Meanwhile, some of the most pressing health risks in our ranks aren’t even on the Army’s radar. A growing number of soldiers can be classified as metabolically obese normal weight, meaning they have a BMI within the normal range — and thus pass height and weight screenings — yet carry a disproportionate amount of body fat relative to lean mass. Often referred to, though insensitively, as “skinny fat,” this condition is better described as having increased visceral adiposity and reduced muscle mass, which can elevate the risk for metabolic syndrome, insulin resistance and cardiovascular disease.

A circumference-based screening method offers a superior means to identify individuals at risk of normal weight obesity, ensuring those who need intervention receive it, preventing or delaying the onset of chronic disease and preserving the fighting strength of the force.

Instead of continuing to punish soldiers for a medical condition, the Army must also implement a structured medical evaluation pathway for those who fail body fat standards.

While obesity is often perceived as merely a behavior-related issue, science shows it is far more complex and shaped by multiple factors. Medical management has evolved alongside this understanding. Individuals are no longer simply labeled as overweight or obese; they are properly assessed to determine the most effective treatment plan. This approach often involves a staging process, such as the American Association of Clinical Endocrinology’s Adiposity-Based Chronic Disease (ABCD) model or Edmonton Obesity Staging System (EOSS), ensuring interventions are both targeted and evidence-based.

It goes without saying, but this is beyond the expertise of unit commanders. As it stands now, there is no requirement for medical evaluation for those exceeding body fat standards. When a soldier exceeds body fat standards, unit commanders should lean on their medical experts by referring soldiers for a medical evaluation to determine which interventions align with established best practices based on that individual’s health profile. Here’s what that could look like:

• Early risk: Soldiers who exceed prescribed body fat standards but show no obesity-related complications should receive proactive intervention. This means connecting them to local resources for nutrition counseling, strength and conditioning support, behavioral health services and wellness coaching under the Army’s Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) System.
• Clinical concern: Soldiers who exceed body fat standards and exhibit clinical markers of obesity-related health risks must receive medical treatment. This includes routine monitoring by medical professionals, medical nutrition therapy from registered dietitians, structured physical activity plans, and, when necessary, pharmacologic or nonsurgical interventions.

These aren’t radical proposals; they’re necessary reforms backed by modern medical science. Failing to act now means allowing preventable health risks to fester, undermining the very foundation of Army readiness.

It’s time for the Army to shift from an antiquated compliance-driven model to one rooted in medical science and performance optimization. Our warfighters deserve better. The question isn’t whether we can afford to make these changes, it’s whether we can afford not to.

Maj. Jordan DeMay is an Army officer who works in the field of nutrition, human performance and health care. He previously served as the nutrition lead for the Army’s Holistic Health and Fitness System, a health care administration fellow at the Defense Health Agency headquarters and other positions as an active-duty dietitian. He has earned Master’s degrees in nutrition, health care administration and business administration from Baylor University. He is board-certified in sports dietetics and is a certified strength and conditioning specialist.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.

This is not a new concept and has been around since the 1960s when Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara sought to base force design around a common set of joint missions rather than the armed services. McNamara’s proposal at least accepted the idea that different geographies, adversaries and missions around the world should govern force design.

Taken at face value, that line of thinking would turn force design over to regional, competing combatant commanders (COCOMs), each with different requirements.

Regional commanders were once components in global deterrence and potential conflict with the Soviet Union, but after the Cold War became competing, regional proconsuls for power and military assets. Only centralized authority in the form of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs and secretaries have the global view necessary to make force design choices suitable to the entire force and not just one geographic area.

McNamara’s missions-based approach did not survive his secretariat, and the services have continued as the primary force supply and design agents for the past half century.

The authority given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Defense civilian officials by the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act provided the “joint” oversight and mission focus that McNamara wanted, but without taking the role of acquisition away from the services.

Acquisition has been a joint process for more than 30 years, with tighter controls implemented by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in response to the 2003 Aldridge report.

How would defense acquisition be improved by turning the process of force design over to a geographically limited COCOM, or a joint staff lacking in service-specific experience? The history of the last thirty-five years suggests this is not a good idea. The post-1991 balkanization of U.S. defense strategy and operations turned the regional commanders from components of a global system to one of Roman-like regional, proconsular authorities, overly focused on their own regions at the expense of global U.S. national security concerns. A weapon system that is particularly useful in one theater might be utterly unsuited to others.

The Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) of War on Terror fame, was well-suited to counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East and was rightfully produced in large numbers for the conflict but is otherwise largely unsuitable for potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Any “joint” force design will still need to be tailored by a central authority expert in those capabilities needed in multiple theaters.

Only the services can really do that.

While “Jointness” has been successful in the post-1990 operational employment of forces, the administrative and especially the acquisition elements of joint processes have been much less productive than before the Goldwater Nichols legislation.

The much-maligned pre-1986 acquisition system produced some of the most effective weapons ever fielded by the United States armed forces to include the M1A1 Abrams tank, the Bradley armored fighting vehicle, the F-15 and F-16 jets, the Navy AEGIS warships, Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines and aircraft like the F-14.

Joint force design since 1986 has not been nearly as successful with numerous, troubled, and cancelled programs to include the Army Future Combat system, the Navy CGX cruiser, DDG-1000, and littoral combat ships, the multi-service F-35 cost issues, and the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

After Goldwater Nichols, dedicated organizations including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC,) and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) were designed to provide a joint perspective on acquisition. They have not, however, been able to drive down the costs of individual programs or increase the speed at which these systems can be deployed. How then can operational joint commands with real world missions and responsibilities also take on acquisition responsibilities?

The service-based force design process is without doubt a messy process, but it has produced successful weapon systems that can be adapted across multiple geographic and combat domains.

Joint force design however has been time consuming, costly and led to increasingly long timelines to field systems. The real “joint” decider in military service acquisition are the civilian leaders in Congress and the presidential administration that must take and live with the force design choices they make.

Steven Wills is the navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy (CMS) at the Navy League of the United States in Washington D.C.

A failure to arm Ukraine will increase the chances that the Kremlin will come back for even more Ukrainian territory in the future. The good news is that the United States can afford to provide Ukraine security assistance and has the means to do so without materially delaying the provision of weapons to Taiwan.

This assertion may surprise some, but consider some facts.

The United States has provided about $67 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Feb 24, 2022, when Putin launched his massive, unprovoked re-invasion. That may sound like an enormous sum, but it actually equates to less than 3 percent of what Washington spent on the Pentagon over the same time period.

And what did Americans get for that relatively modest investment?

U.S. aid has helped Ukraine destroy over 10,500 tanks and other armored vehicles, over 270 aircraft, and a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea fleet. These losses, which will take Russia many years to replace, decrease Putin’s ability to launch further acts of aggression, both against Ukraine and America’s NATO allies.

In short, thanks to Ukrainian bravery and sacrifice — and American weapons — Russia is even weaker relative to the United States and may be less eager and certainly less able to launch future aggression.

That sustainable level of U.S. support for Ukraine has also sent a valuable deterrent message to adversaries elsewhere contemplating additional aggression, including to the Kremlin’s authoritarian “no limit” partner in Beijing, which is considering whether it should try to conquer the free people of Taiwan.

If the United States does not have the political will to provide Ukraine the means of self-defense without putting any U.S. service members in harm’s way, Beijing is likely to conclude Washington will not send Americans to fight in the Taiwan Strait, thereby making Beijing’s aggression more likely.

But does the United States have the industrial capacity to simultaneously arm Ukraine and Taiwan? Or must it choose between them?

We examined 15 major weapons systems and munitions committed to both Ukraine and Taiwan and found that their provision to Kyiv did not delay the delivery of any of them to Taipei by more than a year.

Why is that?

First, the two U.S. partners have somewhat different needs due to their geography and the nature of their actual or potential conflicts.

Second, where there is overlap, the respective production lines are often healthy and/or expanding. For example, the production of Javelin missiles, which the Trump administration provided to Ukraine after the Obama administration refused to do so, is set to double over the next few years.

Third, in several cases, such as TOW missiles, the United States possesses a large inventory or stockpile of the relevant system, which enables its rapid provision to partners from U.S. inventories.

Fourth, most of the weapons Taipei seeks from the United States are being acquired through contracts for new systems, such as the AIM-120C-8 air-to-air missile. By contrast, most of the weapons sent to Kyiv have been older systems already fielded by the U.S. military.

When a neighbor’s home has been stormed by a serial home invader, it is smart to support your neighbor and oppose the intruder. Otherwise, one should expect more home invasions in the future — some of which may be much more costly.

Thankfully, the United States can afford to provide Ukrainians the weapons they need to defend their homes against invading Russian forces, and doing so need not come at the expense of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps that is why Taiwan has urged support for Ukraine.

Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Ryan Brobst is a senior research analyst.

This is a tall task.

Truly disrupting the Pentagon will require starting at the top, specifically adopting a comprehensive joint force design, in which capabilities are developed and integrated cohesively across all military services, domains and functions.

This approach is especially critical for identifying capabilities vital to the joint force, but which no single service has a major interest in funding, because they are “common pool” assets.

By the Joint Staff’s own admission, joint force design is “necessary to produce a unifying vision for the future of the Joint Force.” Yet the U.S. military lacks such a future-oriented framework for guiding joint modernization priorities and timelines. While the Joint Warfighting Concept outlines a broad approach for how the Joint Force should fight in a future conflict, it lacks specificity about which services are expected to provide what future capabilities and on what timelines. As the Marine Corps commandant lamented in 2023, the services lack “a common aimpoint … that says this is where the Joint Force needs to be 5, 6, or 7 years into the future.”

Instead, each branch independently develops its own separate force design, laying out operational capabilities required at varying future dates. The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, which is now known as “Force Design,” emphasizes a lighter and more mobile force armed with long-range sensors and precision-strike weapons. The Navy’s Force Design 2045 proposes a hybrid fleet, in which surface and subsurface uncrewed vessels augment traditional naval assets, while the Air Force’s One Force Design envisions a mix of stand-off, stand-in and asymmetric capabilities designed to attack an adversary’s kill chains. The Army is expected to unveil its new force design later this month.

The problem with this approach is that too often, the driving force behind service choices are budgetary considerations rather than a joint strategic vision. The competition for a larger share of total obligation authority promotes spending on service-centric warfighting capabilities while simultaneously reducing investment in the service-provided capabilities needed to generate and sustain U.S. military power.

This puts the entire joint force at risk.

In economic terms, capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, data connectivity, and logistics are “common pool resources” — when they are procured by one service, they can be used by all under a joint command. Because these assets are non-excludable, each service has incentives to free-ride on the investments of others. Here’s the rub: The validity of each service’s force design depends on the other services’ investments in common pool resources, but there is no forcing function to enforce their provision across the joint force.

Take the Marines’ Force Design as an example: it assumes robust Navy support, including logistics, intelligence, and mobility. The Navy’s Navigation Plan 2024, however, make no mention of the Navy’s important role in supporting and sustaining Marine stand-in Forces. Why? Because no joint mechanism exists to ensure service force designs either fulfill these dependencies or envision forces which are not dependent on common pool resources.

This is particularly troubling because U.S. military advantage increasingly requires cross-domain, and therefore cross-service, solutions.

A common understanding in force design is that each service should strive to dominate its own domain. Each domain — land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace — offers unique advantages that, when combined, generate more robust and flexible national military capabilities. Each domain also has specific vulnerabilities best mitigated from other domains, and possibly by other services. For example, ground forces have limited visibility from the ground, but, with access to the air, space, and even cyber domains, have the potential to see further. While domain expertise is essential, an overemphasis on domain-centric superiority can undermine the fighting effectiveness of the joint force, particularly when it leads to missed opportunities to develop new capabilities that operate across multiple domains.

To achieve an effective joint force, the Department of Defense should start with a joint force design, deliberately integrating domain-specific expertise into a unified force design. Such a design would prioritize the creation of options over the creation of platforms, ensuring military capabilities align with overarching national security objectives, not just individual service preferences.

This joint force design should also identify those common pool resources which are chronically underfunded in service budgets, acknowledge their critical importance to the entire joint force, and drive resources to them.

To make that happen, the Pentagon ought to move some acquisition authorities away from the services, structuring the budget around the joint force design rather than just service-specific priorities. The current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System often fails to align funding with the true needs of the joint force, resulting in inefficiencies and capability gaps. Reforming Pentagon budgeting is therefore essential to ensure US defense dollars are used efficiently and effectively and not misallocated because of unproductive bureaucratic competition among the services.

Rethinking and redesigning the current force structure is not merely an option — it is a necessity for maintaining military advantage in an increasingly complex global security environment.

Col. Maximilian K. Bremer, US Air Force, is the director of the Advanced Programs Division at Air Mobility Command.

Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and an adjunct professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University.

This commentary does not necessarily reflect the views of the US Defense Department, or the US Air Force.

Yet the U.S. Army — three field armies, six corps and 21 divisions — fought 24 campaigns in the Indo-Pacific in World War II. That’s more campaigns than the Army fought in all other theaters combined in that existential global conflict, and far more than the Marine Corps.

It’s easy to dismiss the Army as irrelevant today in the Indo-Pacific. Yet history tells us otherwise.

Indeed, if America is to effectively deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific, we must be seen by adversaries to pack a serious punch, and that means a significant role for the U.S. Army, because if war comes, America will have to give it all we’ve got.

The Army fights as an integral part of the entire joint force, and it fights as part of the combined force with our allies and partners. We can’t have one of the major elements of the joint force — the Army — mostly sitting on the bench.

That’s why the Army has been investing heavily in the past several years in modernization, not only so it has the right capabilities for any contingency anywhere in the world, but also so it can effectively counter aggression from a peer adversary in the Indo-Pacific.

No feature of Army modernization is more important and relevant to this effort than the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) — a tiltrotor aircraft that can take off, hover and land like a helicopter, yet fly horizontally like an airplane.

Flying conventional helicopters, the U.S. can’t leverage the bench strength that the Army can bring to bear, especially in the vastness of the Indo-Pacific theater. The truncated range and speed of the UH-60 Black Hawk, for example, simply does not provide sufficient capability to give the Army the reach it needs.

With the FLRAA advanced tiltrotor, the Army becomes meaningfully additive to the joint force in the Indo-Pacific.

Just look at what happened to the Marine Corps when they replaced the conventional CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter with the Osprey — the tiltrotor fundamentally transformed the Corps’ concepts of operation.

The Corps went from being able to carry eight Marines 60 miles in a single aircraft, to being able to transport an entire platoon hundreds of miles. Marines suddenly could base farther from shore and strike deeper inland.

The increase in speed and range, combined with runway independence, also opened up new mission sets. Marines could self-deploy over long distances. They could operate in austere, unimproved environments, whether desert or jungle.

Distributed operations became a reality, where Marines could be dispersed over wide areas, making targeting more difficult for the enemy and increasing survivability. This distributed operational posture also gave Marines more flexibility in maneuver, creating more dilemmas for the enemy.

The Army currently lacks these capabilities and thus, these advantages. The Army pioneered the concept of air assault, forged in the crucible of Vietnam, that gave our fighting forces the ability to overcome the tyranny of terrain and take the fight directly to the enemy.

It’s time to give today’s soldiers that same advantage over our future, sophisticated enemies.

The Army is a maneuver force. That means it embodies both movement and fires. If you engage only at range with fires, you stall out in attrition warfare. To finish the fight, you need to move assault forces at distances consistent with long-range precision and joint fires in order to achieve decisive results. FLRAA gives the Army a 21st-century capability for conducting such maneuver warfare.

Whether seizing terrain or conducting raids and ambushes, the FLRAA tiltrotor’s speed, range, survivability and payload will be critical, especially in the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. Consider what this tiltrotor technology will mean to medical evacuation, maritime interdiction, combat search and rescue, humanitarian relief, tactical resupply and armed escort. It changes the fundamental concepts for how our Army will fight.

The Army is developing new concepts of operation to achieve “large-scale, long-range air assault,” or L2A2. This is intended to “deliver one brigade combat team in one period of darkness, over 500 miles, arriving behind enemy lines, and able to conduct sustained combat operations,” said Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, who leads the 101st Airborne Division. Today’s force, equipped with Black Hawks, requires multiple periods of darkness and large numbers of soldiers, equipment and fuel to achieve the same result.

If we fail to modernize the Army’s air assault and adopt new doctrines around advanced tiltrotor capability, we will be leaving significant forces off the field. Imagine a war in the Pacific where the Army, our largest service in terms of personnel, is forced to sit on the sidelines for lack of relevant capability.

That’s why Congress and the Army need to stop spending precious funds on modernizing legacy Black Hawks. Modernizing the Black Hawk provides only incremental improvements; it does not give the Army the meaningful quantum leap in capability that we need in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.

We are in a zero-sum budgeting environment, and every dollar spent on Black Hawk modernization is a dollar not spent on a game-changing transformation of the Army. Very simply, that program does not provide enough bang for the buck.

The decisions our policymakers in Washington make today will decide whether America can bring to bear all of our potential military end strength, or just some of it, to resist aggression in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere for the foreseeable future.

Let’s not sideline some of our best players — we need to go all-in for the win in the Indo-Pacific. That means full-throttle support for the FLRAA tiltrotor program so we can bring the Army to the fight.

Maj. Gen. Rudolph “Rudy” Ostovich (ret.) is the former chief of branch and commanding general of U.S. Army Aviation Center. He also served as the Army’s director of doctrine, J5 Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (today’s U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) and vice director of the Joint Staff with over 30 years of active duty as both an infantry and aviation officer.

Hegseth obfuscated to such an extent that the inescapable conclusion was that he rejects the laws and treaties requiring U.S. forces to abide by these long-established principles — among them, not torturing POWs, not harming civilians and not wantonly destroying homes or schools.

Then, shortly after taking the oath of office, Hegseth fired the top lawyers for the Army, Navy and Air Force. He did so reportedly without having spoken to any of them.

Hegseth has often asserted that the Pentagon’s lawyers have unduly restricted U.S. warfighters on the battlefield. But he’s mistaken: It’s not the lawyers who hold American service members to such high standards, but the law itself. His decision represents a blatant disregard for that law.

Hegseth: Top military lawyers fired because they weren’t ‘well-suited’

The U.S. military is the best fighting force in the world, not only because it is equipped with the most sophisticated technology and lethal weapons but because it trains to win a war of principles.

U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are taught that the job of a warfighter is not just to kill the enemy and win the battle, but to win the war by upholding the values, legitimacy and honor of our country and the reputation of the U.S. military. That means training to operate as a disciplined force, but also abiding by the Geneva Conventions, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and federal criminal law on war crimes.

The laws of war are neither a new creation nor some foreign imposition. They are, in part, an American innovation. Amid the bloodiest war in American history, President Lincoln codified fundamental aspects of the laws of armed conflict in the Lieber Code, which formed the foundation for the Geneva Conventions.

The fundamental principles underlying the Geneva Conventions might seem obvious today — that war should not cause unnecessary suffering; that noncombatants deserve protection; that medical personnel must be allowed to perform their humanitarian work; that certain methods of warfare are simply too inhumane to be permitted; and that even in war, there must be rules that preserve human dignity.

There are 196 state parties to the Geneva Conventions. These principles guide a baseline of behavior in armed conflict that has been nearly universally accepted. They protect not only civilians but also combatants, ensuring care for our own injured soldiers and POWs that fall under the control of foreign forces.

The same is true of our Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is derived from the principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. They are not simply aspirations that service members are free to ignore or interpret as they please. They are the law — the basis of the integrity and discipline that make the U.S. military the most respected in the world — and every U.S. service member is bound and trained to follow them.

Consider the alternative. U.S. troops intentionally or recklessly shoot a defenseless civilian or torture a prisoner. Of course, this is behavior that the American people firmly reject. Both are war crimes, and neither helps the U.S. win wars. But Hegseth is on record defending this type of criminal misconduct. Now, he is terminating the career lawyers whose job was to provide warfighters with the guidance necessary to comply with the law.

The unmistakable message is that Hegseth doesn’t trust America’s service members. And, the message that will be heard by young recruits is that the ends justify the means, no matter how egregious or inhumane the misconduct.

These actions make civilians and service members alike less safe. In Afghanistan and Iraq, like Vietnam decades earlier, we saw how civilian deaths, for which U.S. forces were rarely punished, turned the local population against U.S. forces and into the arms of the enemy.

We also learned that respecting the laws of war helps protect our own troops from losing faith in the mission and suffering moral injury. They will have to live the rest of their lives with the memories of those they killed, and it is difficult to overstate the importance of knowing they acted in a manner that was lawful and honorable. When our military leaders abandon the institutional mechanisms to uphold the law and protect civilians, they betray the trust of the warfighters who risk their lives for our country.

Some frustrated veterans, like Hegseth, argue, in essence, that if U.S. forces had been allowed to act with unchecked brutality and impunity, we would have been victorious in those wars.

But that is not the lesson our decorated military experts at the National War College or West Point have learned. Decades of military studies and tactical reviews have concluded that when U.S. forces used excessive force or killed civilians with impunity, our mission suffered.

Despite an enduring ability to unleash immense firepower against our enemies, we have faced setbacks every time the U.S. mistakenly bombed an innocent family or empowered a corrupt and abusive warlord.

From the U.S. Constitution to the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, our democracy is built on the rule of law. Our nation’s lawyers in uniform are responsible for ensuring that our armed forces live up to and protect the values and principles our nation stands for. Firing them, and dismissing their value, is a grave error.

As the oldest democracy with the most powerful military, it’s in our national interest to uphold the laws of war. And perhaps most importantly, it distinguishes us from adversaries who do not share the American people’s appreciation of the incalculable value of innocent life.

Patrick Leahy is a former U.S. senator, Senate president pro tempore and attorney who represented Vermont in the U.S. Senate from 1975 to 2023.

Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard Jr. (Ret.), is a graduate of West Point who served in the Korean and Vietnam wars and as president of the National Defense University.

But is Elon Musk the man for the job?

The biggest problem with letting Musk have access to this information is not that he’s overzealous, misguided, unelected, or wealthy—it’s that he and his staff pose significant national security risks.

There is no evidence that Musk has the responsibility, knowledge, or understanding of the reasons and procedures for protecting sensitive personal or national security data. Indeed, there is rather extensive evidence to the contrary.

Before Donald Trump returned to office, Musk became the subject of no fewer than three military security reviews and was denied high-level security access by the Air Force. The reason for this scrutiny is Musk’s extensive ties to foreign adversaries, which has allegedly included multiple, high-level conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top Russian officials, which were not disclosed as required by law.

Musk also has extensive ties to China. Tesla, Musk’s electric car company makes about half of its automobiles at a massive Shanghai plant known as the “Gigafactory” and had to borrow around $1.4 billion from state-controlled banks. These entanglements can prove worrisome because Chinese intelligence law gives the communist regime free and unfettered access to any corporate data of interest.

As someone who has spent years overseeing the verification and compliance of arms control agreements, I understand how important it is to protect national security-sensitive data. The information DOGE would have access to is not limited to spreadsheets of inefficiencies—it includes vital details on U.S. military and intelligence capabilities, readiness, and strategic deterrence. Allowing Musk’s organization access to such information risks compromising the nuclear force posture assessments, arms treaty compliance reports, and national security directives that are crucial to maintaining U.S. strategic superiority.

We simply cannot risk China or Russia gaining access to national security data, including Defense Department records, Department of Energy data on U.S. nuclear capabilities, and intelligence community data on U.S. collection capabilities.

If China or Russia gain access to the DoD data DOGE will need to carry out its audit, they could obtain an inside view of the U.S. military’s capabilities and weaknesses. This could help Russia in its ongoing spat with Ukraine or provide China with a clear edge in any future conflict over Taiwan.

Perhaps Musk would prefer it that way. In 2022, he proposed turning the island nation into a “special administrative zone” of the People’s Republic, the same status that failed to save Hong Kong from CCP tyranny. He’s also criticized any attempts to economically decouple the U.S. from China, despite the national security threats this entanglement poses.

When dealing with arms control negotiations and matters related to U.S. treaty compliance, I saw firsthand how sensitive data can be leveraged by adversaries. Safeguarding national security information is a fundamental necessity for maintaining U.S. global power and the nation’s overall strategy of deterrence.

The Trump administration must proceed with caution. DOGE’s mission may be a reasonable one, but if Musk’s involvement ends up exposing sensitive civilian and military data to our greatest geopolitical adversaries, a few billion in government waste will be the least of our problems.

Paula A. DeSutter was United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation from 2002 to 2009.

One important change is to partner with Congress to ensure that decisions on arms transfers are timely, sustainable and efficient.

In 2012, the State Department established a process, dubbed the “Tiered Review System,” whereby the State Department would “informally” preview prospective defense article transfers and licenses to the congressional committees of jurisdiction (Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee) before initiating the formal notification that is required under the Arms Export Control Act.

This process is not statutory and is memorialized by an exchange of letters between Congress and the State Department, thereby allowing changes without having to pass a law. Both sides of the aisle have a specific amount of time – depending on the country – to ask questions and share views on the prospective sale. This process has also allowed for the identification of potential problems or challenges prior to the public announcement that accompanies “formal” notification. Hierarchical ranking of countries determines the review duration and cost for consideration, e.g., shorter review periods and higher cost thresholds for NATO countries.

This process was based on the belief that identifying and resolving potential problems prior to formal review and public notification could avoid a Joint Congressional Resolution of Disapproval of the sale, which would be harmful to the bilateral relationship and embarrassing for all stakeholders. Bipartisan buy-in for defense transfers – particularly transfers that take years to deliver – helps U.S. security cooperation partners have confidence that both political parties will support the transfer throughout the 20–30-year life cycle of the system.

Congress plays a vital role in foreign policy and in building our security relationships, and U.S. partners and industry need to see the signal from Congress of commitment to the longevity of the transfer. The Tiered Review process was meant to provide a mechanism to demonstrate that commitment.

In practice, the Tiered Review process has evolved into a way for a single member of Congress to exercise a veto over weapons sale or technology transfer for reasons that may not have anything to do with foreign or defense policy. Though the process was designed with expedience in mind, the end result has been complications and delays.

Congress is not receiving the information it needs; the defense industry is not receiving the certainty it needs; the executive branch is not receiving the efficiency it needs; and some security cooperation partners are not receiving the weapons they need.

Weapons sales that were meant to move forward in a month’s time have been stalled for years, resulting in frustration for all the U.S. stakeholders and our allies and partners. In a rapidly evolving global security environment, we can no longer afford to delay the transfer of military capabilities to our allies and partners. In their frustration, some may turn to our economic and security rivals.

The answer is not to just abandon the Tiered Review process, as some have suggested. Weapons sales are, at their core, a foreign policy tool, and members of Congress must have a role in shaping key elements of this policy. All stakeholders, U.S. and foreign, still need the certainty that comes from a supportive Congress. Completely abandoning the informal notification process would deprive the process of this essential support and is therefore unacceptable. That said, it is long past time to replace the current Tiered Review process with a new process that restores the working partnership between Congress, the executive branch, and the defense industrial base. We need a process that strengthens the confidence of our allies and partners and strikes a balance between due diligence and speed.

We believe our recommendations would help this process get back on track.

Under a new process, which we call the Arms Transfer and Export Review Series (ATER Series), the State Department would continue to preview potential transfers and licenses to Congressional committees of jurisdiction before formal notification. This process would continue to be informal in that it would not be written into law to allow for flexibility and changes. All requirements of the Arms Export Control Act would still apply.

For ATER Series 1 cases, (most NATO allies and our closest partners, as well as maintenance and sustainment cases for transfers that have already been adjudicated) the administration should be able to move more seamlessly through the process. The administration and Congress should work collaboratively to produce the exact list of countries in Series 1. The administration will send a weekly informal notification that these sales will be formally and publicly notified the following week. No formal clearance would be required before formal notification, but the Arms Export Control Act would still allow for congressional opposition via Joint Resolutions of Disapproval. This would also allow congressional staff and members of Congress the time to focus on more complicated cases.

For ATER Series 2 cases (most other countries), Congress would receive informal notification of transfers and would have 20 days to review before these transfers move ahead to formal notification. Once questions from a chairman or ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction are sent to the State Department, the review period should be paused while the executive formulates a response. Each chairman and ranking member would have one opportunity during the time period to ask questions, and then the review period would resume.

The 30-day clock could stop up to four times – once for each ranking member or chair to ask their questions. The review period could be a time when the committee and the executive branch share views on conditionality or leverage with respect to a certain transfer. The clock will resume once the executive branch responds to the question(s). This review period ensures that Congress is well informed and avoids the scenario of the executive violating a congressional “hold.” Once the review period has expired and the executive determines it wants to proceed with formal notification to the full Congress, a member of Congress can only seek to stop a sale through a Joint Resolution of Disapproval pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act.

ATER Series 3 would follow a similar method as Series 2; 30 days for review, with applicable pauses – but would also include the analysis for how the transfer would affect Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, which is required by law. This will allow lawmakers to consider how transfers to the Middle East would impact Israel’s security, according to the law.

Security cooperation is one of the most important tools that the United States has to build alliances and partnerships, encourage burden sharing, increase interoperability, grow U.S. jobs, and protect U.S. competitiveness and technological superiority. Congress can and should play a key role in deciding how this tool is used in accordance with the law. That said, we must find the right balance between congressional due diligence and meeting the needs of our allies and partners in a timely fashion.

To that end, we should replace the current Tiered Review with a more transparent, predictable process that can serve the interests of all stakeholders and more rapidly advance U.S. security goals.

Charles Hooper is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and former director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Mira Resnick is the former deputy assistant secretary of State for regional security in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs.

While Hegseth stressed that the United States remains committed to NATO – “full stop” – three points that he emphasized created greater doubts. The ball is now in Europe’s court to address those three points with initiatives at the NATO summit, to be held in the Hague this June.

If Europe responds positively, it can place NATO on a new healthy footing.

First, Hegseth reinforced President Trump’s demand that Europeans spend 5% of GDP on defense. A “Strategic Responsibility Initiative” at the Summit should address this demand. While stronger military capabilities are the important outcome, politically this percentage has become a visible measure of whether Europe is sharing enough of NATO’s burden.

NATO Europe in the aggregate now meets NATO’s benchmark floor of 2% spending, although important outliers like Italy and Spain are not yet there.

By comparison, the U.S. spends just under 3.5%. Reaching 5% for Europe could be a useful long term goal, which might allow Europe to defend itself without much U.S. assistance. But transitioning to that capability will take considerable time. Europe is nowhere near ready to defend itself.

A feasible goal for this Strategic Responsibility Initiative might be a European pledge to match in the aggregate the percentage of GDP that America spends on defense by the end of the decade.

Spending at the 3.5% level, which NATO’s leadership supports, would allow Europe to implement Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s new defense plan for Europe. Accomplishing that by the end of the decade would also address Russia’s expected military reconstitution after the Ukraine war ends.

The Strategic Responsibility Initiative could also begin to address Trump’s 5% demand by focusing on the most vulnerable front-line states. Trump has previously said he might not agree to defend nations who do not spend enough on their own defense.

The three Baltic states plus Poland are the most vulnerable NATO countries to Russian aggression. Together these four states might take the 5% pledge at the Hague summit. Poland is nearly there. Lithuania has pledged to spend 5% soon.

Latvia and Estonia are not far behind and should be encouraged to make such a joint pledge, together setting a good example to the rest of Europe.

Second, Hegseth said robust security guarantees underpinned by capable peacekeeping forces are needed for Ukraine. But he made clear that they should not be provided under NATO auspices or by the United States.

While he subsequently walked back a statement that Ukrainian membership in NATO was not a realistic outcome of negotiations, President Trump has also indicated that the U.S. was unlikely to support Ukrainian membership anytime soon.

Trump unfortunately seems determined to honor Putin’s veto on NATO membership for Ukraine.

Several major European states have taken up the challenge. A second NATO summit initiative should be built around security guarantees for Ukraine. This might take the form of a coalition of the willing. But a much more effective mechanism would be a robust EU-led peacekeeping force, augmented by other key nations.

The EU has its own military command and experience in over 40 small overseas operations. This would be the EU’s largest mission, but it would demonstrate Europe’s willingness to defend its own interests.

With such a deployment, the EU should also set aside complicated hurdles and rapidly embrace Ukrainian membership. That way the EU Article 42(7) mutual defense clause would extend to Ukraine, a linkage Russia would have to take seriously. Once this mechanism is in place, the U.S. should be encouraged to participate.

Third, Hegseth stressed that the Trump administration would prioritize deterring war with China. Given China’s aggressive military behavior in Asia and its rapid military modernization, deterring this peer competitor is not an unreasonable goal for the United States. But it need not come at the expense of instability and possible military miscalculation in Europe.

A third Hague Summit package – a NATO “Asian Partnership Initiative” – could make it clear to the Trump administration that NATO has a useful role in helping the United States deter Chinese aggression. Once this is recognized, the U.S. should be encouraged to retain a strong NATO alliance.

The 2024 NATO summit in Washington took several steps in this direction. It declared China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. It called China a systemic challenge to the Euro-Atlantic area. And it called the Into-Pacific region “important” to NATO’s security.

At The Hague, NATO needs to create specific actions to demonstrate NATO’s willingness to deal with an aggressive China, short of an Article 5 commitment. It might declare that the Into-Pacific region is “vital” to NATO’s security. It might create a formal NATO-Indo-Pacific Council linking America’s European and Asian allies, with ongoing consultations at the political and military level.

A new “coercion against one is coercion against all” standard could underpin the new Council. It might make clear that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan would have catastrophic global consequences for China.

NATO might establish new intelligence sharing mechanisms with Asian partners. It might create liaison offices in Brussels, Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra. It might create a NATO Center of Excellence in Asia on economic security challenges. It might establish formal NATO freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea.

While Hegseth’s remarks seemed at first to destabilize the Alliance, if Europe responds positively along the lines of the three summit initiatives discussed above, the net result could be a new and more stable Alliance.

The outcome is now in Europe’s hands.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as NSC senior director for defense policy, director of NDU’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and acting director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff.

Daniel S. Hamilton is senior non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS. He served as deputy assistant secretary of State for Europe and associate director of the policy planning staff for two U.S. secretaries of State.

This came as something of a surprise. And Ukraine’s success may have lessons to offer the U.S. Department of Defense as the government explores new avenues for efficiency.

Before the war, Ukraine’s military acquisition system was slow, opaque, and dominated by a state-owned enterprise, UkrOboronProm (literally, Ukraine Defense Industry). As late as 2021, experts predicted UkrOboronProm’s imminent collapse.

Once the war began, Ukraine abandoned this old system and embraced commercial technology. The Ukrainians have purchased drones on the commercial market and affixed them with explosives to target Russian forces. In one example, Ukraine used Soviet-era RKG-3 anti-tank hand grenades, which traditionally required the user to be close to the tank to employ. But by using domestically developed drones, Ukrainians could drop RKG-3 grenades modified with tail-fins onto Russian tanks and other armored vehicles.

Perhaps Ukraine’s most innovative solution to rapid fielding during conflict has been its standup of Brave1 — an organization charged with linking warfighter demand to foreign and domestic technology developers at speed. Brave1 has made over 400 grants to developers adding up to over UAH 800 million (about $19 million). Brave1 has provided support to the development of AI systems like the Swarmer drone and the Griselda intelligence system.

Of course, context matters: Ukraine’s processes, organizational models, and rules cannot be exactly replicated in the U.S. or elsewhere. But there are still at least two valuable lessons here for the Pentagon.

First, the U.S. Defense Department might benefit from leveraging commercial technology more aggressively. In many domains, commercial technology is more advanced and less expensive than military tech. In fact, Ukraine’s experience suggests that the advantage of adapting commercial technology may be particularly strong during an ongoing conflict, when capability gaps appear suddenly, and urgency precludes undergoing traditional acquisition processes.

For example, DoD might consider adopting parts of Ukrainian’s drone acquisition approach, especially the acquisition of cheaper commercial drones that can be modified quickly for specific mission needs. Such systems could provide DoD with cheaper methods of collecting intelligence or executing strikes.

Various policies have been proposed to leverage U.S. commercial innovation. These include greater enforcement of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, the establishment of a new agency within the Defense Department focused on rapid technology development and deployment, and increasing the reprogramming cap. Late last year Sen. Roger Wicker, who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, introduced the FoRGED (Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense) Act, which proposes extensive changes intended to streamline the Pentagon’s acquisition of commercial tech. While Ukraine’s success in deploying commercial technology during the war does not suggest which of the myriad policy options would work best in the United States, it highlights that the rationale behind such proposed measures is sound.

And the second lesson: Brave1 has demonstrated how government innovation agencies can accelerate the acquisition and deployment of weapons systems during conflict. Brave1 is modeled after Defense Innovation Unit, established in 2015, so the Pentagon already recognizes the value of such an organization. But Brave1′s approach—using an online platform to connect warfighters with specific operational needs to technology developers—illustrates one method of meeting rapidly changing needs during conflict.

There are other lessons the Defense Department might take from Ukraine’s experience as well. For instance, Ukraine has expedited fielding by delegating procurement authority to the platoon level. It has also successfully established a high-tech military industry cluster in Kyiv. Of course, the U.S. and Ukraine have different industrial and geopolitical contexts, but that shouldn’t prevent the U.S. defense leaders from extracting lessons about ways to rapidly equip warfighters with new technology.

Jon Schmid is a senior political scientist at RAND. Erik E. Mueller is a defense analyst at RAND.

Renewable energy is a politically volatile topic, but U.S. military leaders should not categorically dismiss the benefits. Investing in energy resilience measures today, including in renewable energy, could make a large difference in future military preparedness. One solution that could reduce reliance on the civilian grid and on fossil fuels is continuing research and development into wind, solar, and hydro-powered microgrids. Microgrids are localized energy systems that can power a military installation in conjunction with the civilian electric grid but be disconnected when necessary.

Developing independent power infrastructure for the military is important because our civilian power distribution networks are vulnerable to natural disasters and malicious actors. Some experts estimate that, with the rise of smart appliances, there are over 24,000 weak-points in the U.S. electric grid that are vulnerable to either physical or cyber attack. It is too expensive for the DoD to fortify the entire electric grid; it is far easier to ensure energy resilience on bases instead. The Air Force, Army and Navy highlighted infrastructure resilience as a priority in recent basing and facilities strategies.

Logistics networks, such as those needed for fueling a combustion plant or a diesel generator, are also vulnerable. In Afghanistan, for example, experts estimate that one out of every 24 fuel convoys faced attacks resulting in at least one casualty. The same risks would only be higher in a conflict with a near-peer adversary. Conflict might not merely disrupt fuel flows but could halt fuel deliveries altogether. While we do not often think of our domestic bases (outside of Hawaii and Guam) as particularly vulnerable, if an adversary can hack the White House Office of Personnel Management or the Treasury Department, they can likely affect power generation for at least some U.S. bases.

Indeed, though general systems, like refrigeration and lighting, are very important, other critical systems rely on constant power generation as well. Most command-and-control systems would be hurt by energy outages, as would runway lighting, radar equipment, and weather warning systems. Buildings that store highly classified information rely on intrusion systems to prevent unauthorized access of information. Those systems are useless without power, leaving those areas to be watched by individual service members, which, in turn, removes them from other valuable tasks

Thus, the military requires more power and more reliable power than most civilian installations of similar purpose. Military analysts have discussed how using renewable-powered microgrids can enhance resilience and produce more power at the installation during times of peak need. Today, however, the most common power back-up is a diesel generator. These generators still rely on fuel and fuel logistics, which means they are only as resilient as the fossil fuel supply chain itself. Microgrids powered by renewables could be especially valuable, therefore, in more austere locations far removed from traditional supply corridors.

To anticipate and circumvent energy vulnerabilities, DoD can employ microgrids on bases, focusing on forms of energy generation that don’t need extensive logistics. In California, bases have already begun deploying microgrids using solar power. Solar power, if used in the right locations, could run bases for weeks on end. Wind is another alternative. In Ukraine, leaders learned quickly that wind energy is much less vulnerable to physical attack than traditional energy sources. Rather than shooting at one power plant, for example, an adversary seeking to disable a wind farm would have to score hits on multiple individual windmills. Even the transformer or substation at a wind farm can be repaired relatively quickly, enabling the site to recover.

Investing in wind, solar, or hydro-powered microgrids domestically would provide an opportunity for the U.S. military to learn how to create non-fuel reliant power. Learning how to build and use microgrids on domestic bases in peacetime would provide necessary training and expertise; the lessons we can learn on bases at home could then be translated to bases abroad. Microgrids that do not rely on fossil fuel supply chains would be hugely beneficial in powering installations across the Indo-Pacific in the event of a conflict with China.

The U.S. military should test and refine innovative alternatives to civilian energy generation on domestic bases to protect from power disruptions – whether from natural disasters or an adversary. Microgrids powered by non-fuel-reliant energy sources offer a promising solution to enhance domestic base resilience. By investing in and implementing these innovative energy solutions, the U.S. military can simultaneously strengthen installations now and better prepare for the operational challenges of tomorrow.

Nevada Joan Lee is a research associate, and Christopher Preble is a senior fellow and director, in the Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program.

This truth extends beyond AI. When it comes to American space capabilities, it has been clear for some time that Russia and China are focused not only on their own advances, but also on stealing

American plans and technologies from throughout our space industry. For President Trump to meet his goals of NASA reaching the moon and traveling to Mars and of American security through strength, additional actions to protect American technology and data will be required.

As the space race has continued to intensify, more companies are involved in critical U.S. space missions—both for the Department of Defense and for NASA—than ever before. While these companies bring benefits of competition and quickly evolving, advanced technologies, they also increase the risk that potential adversaries can gain access to American advances.

China and Russia (often partnering together in space) continue aggressively targeting America’s space technology. For example, in August 2023, the Air Force, FBI, and National Counterintelligence and Security Center noted that Chinese and Russian space agencies are attempting to steal technology from SpaceX and Blue Origin, on whom NASA and DOD increasingly rely.

“Foreign intelligence entities recognize the importance of the commercial space industry to the U.S. economy and national security, including the growing dependence of critical infrastructure on space-based assets,” the Air Force’s advisory read. “They see U.S. space-related innovation and assets as potential threats as well as valuable opportunities to acquire vital technologies and expertise.”

These aggressive actions mean United Launchh Alliance, SpaceX, Blue Origin, and every private contractor and subcontractor used by the Pentagon and NASA must continue to tighten their security protocols. And U.S. security agencies must increase their monitoring of compliance, recognizing how critical these companies are to American space infrastructure and capabilities.

The change in American reliance on a greater range of space companies has been fast and dramatic. It seems like just yesterday that I attended meetings in my Air Force role with a then-frustrated SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, who was seeking to lift bureaucratic hurdles so that his company could launch more satellites for the Defense Department. Ten years later, SpaceX is now conducting the majority of government-sponsored launches (including both NASA and national security space missions). With this great private involvement by SpaceX and others comes the great private responsibility for these firms to protect not only their own proprietary technology, but the secrets that keep this country safe and in the lead.

In December, the New York Times reported that SpaceX and its CEO are currently under review by the Air Force and others for repeatedly failing “to comply with federal reporting protocols aimed at protecting state secrets,” including by not disclosing their meetings with prominent Russian foreign leaders.

This headline happened to focus on SpaceX, but the challenge and responsibility here fall on the entire private space industry.

While Silicon Valley ingenuity clearly improves America’s defense technologies, the two cultures—of the tech industry and those charged inside the government with American security—are challengingly different. The benefits of the tech industry’s stereotypical speed and advances must be recognized. But the Pentagon cannot only worry about getting rockets off the ground faster. It must concern itself with one of its core missions – keeping America’s leading adversaries at bay at the same time.

The solutions will be challenging, but they already exist for many defense companies who provide weapons systems to the Pentagon. NASA and DOD should impose stricter federal vetting standards and divestiture requirements as a condition for receiving government work. It should mandate that companies remove any potential connections to China and Russia that it deems to be of concern.

Incoming Pentagon and NASA leaders have the opportunity both to work with space industry partners, and to ensure that greater safeguards are put in place to protect American technology and information. Failing to do so could lead to China and Russia space preeminence, an outcome in no American or allied interest.

Erin C. Conaton served as the 23rd Under Secretary of the Air Force and the 6th Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

However, this vital task places engineers at significant risk, making the need for technological advancements — specifically remote-controlled and autonomous breaching devices — more pressing than ever.

Challenges for mounted combat engineers

Mounted combat engineers typically use vehicles to clear routes and breach obstacles. The U.S. Army’s Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV), a tracked, armored platform based on the M1 Abrams tank, is central to this mission. The ABV is equipped with systems for in-stride breaching of minefields and complex obstacles, such as a mine plow and the Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC), which allows for remote detonation of mines.

Though effective, the ABV has a significant vulnerability: It is a high-value target for enemy forces, increasing the risk to its crew. This makes it clear that the future of battlefield breaching may lie in autonomous or remote-controlled vehicles, which could reduce the exposure of soldiers to enemy threats.

Recent developments show progress in this direction. In 2021, the Army initiated a program to integrate teleoperation capabilities into the ABV. By 2022, the Army awarded a contract to Cybernet for a robotic system designed to allow remote operation of these vehicles. Prototypes have shown promise, successfully clearing obstacles during training exercises, and more developments are expected in the near future. To maximize the potential of this technology, the Army could also explore the creation of new military specialties focused on the operation and maintenance of remote-controlled breaching systems.

Challenges for dismounted combat engineers

While mounted engineers have significant support from armored vehicles, dismounted engineers face a more dangerous set of challenges. Often required to clear obstacles on foot, they must carry heavy equipment, such as grappling hooks and explosive charges, through hostile terrain. Without the protection of vehicles, dismounted engineers are highly vulnerable to enemy fire. Currently, remote-controlled robots and drones are used to detect obstacles from a safe distance, but these devices cannot carry out the full range of breaching tasks that dismounted engineers perform, such as placing explosives or clearing large obstacles.

The need for more advanced autonomous or remote-controlled breaching tools is clear. Such devices could enable engineers to clear paths and neutralize threats from a safe distance, significantly reducing the risk to soldiers. By bridging the gap between current capabilities and the demand for fully autonomous systems, the Army could better protect dismounted engineers while maintaining operational effectiveness.

The need for technological advancements

Both mounted and dismounted combat engineers face challenges in ensuring mobility for their units, and technological advancements offer a viable solution. Remote-controlled and autonomous breaching devices can help mitigate the dangers that engineers face while performing their essential tasks. The need for these innovations in modern warfare, where rapid adaptability and enhanced safety are crucial, has never been more apparent. By investing in the development of autonomous systems for both mounted and dismounted engineers, the military can increase the efficiency and safety of its combat engineering units.

As technology continues to evolve, the military must prioritize the development of remote-controlled and autonomous breaching devices. This will not only safeguard soldiers but also enhance the flexibility and effectiveness of combat engineers. The strides made in the field of remote-controlled breaching vehicles, particularly with the ABV, provide a strong foundation. The next step is to extend these advancements to dismounted operations, ensuring that engineers can safely and effectively carry out their missions on all terrains.

Embracing technological innovation will ensure that combat engineers remain equipped to fulfill their critical role in modern warfare. As lessons from current conflicts continue to shape military strategies, remote-controlled and autonomous devices will become indispensable tools for enhancing battlefield mobility, counter-mobility and survivability — ultimately ensuring the success of military operations.

Michael Hamilton is a captain in the U.S. Army currently pursuing a master’s degree in Geological Engineering.

Americans see the annual defense budget grow, seemingly without bounds, from approximately $650 billion in 2017 to just over $800 billion in 2021, to around $900 billion today. At the same time, Americans are told by distinguished and elite blue-ribbon panels like the 2024 report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy that they are no safer, that the world has become more dangerous in spite of American efforts, and that still more investment and more sacrifice are needed at a time when average Americans are struggling to pay bills worth dozens or hundreds – not billions – of dollars.

Of the benefits that Americans are told they reap in return for investing vast sums in defense, many are diffuse or difficult to perceive, like maintaining the free flow of commerce and preserving the liberty of like-minded democracies. Meanwhile the costs in taxation, opportunities lost because money spent on defense is not invested elsewhere, and the lives of American service members that are lost are felt by the American people in a much more direct and immediate way.

All this has led to an understandable desire to lay down those burdens and retreat from global leadership. But the historical record, almost from the founding of the United States, suggests that this approach is not likely to succeed. The United States’ attempt to avoid the problem of Barbary piracy nonetheless ended in the creation of the U.S. Navy and its dispatch to the Mediterranean. Our attempt to remain neutral in the Napoleonic Wars pulled us into the War of 1812. We entered the First and Second World Wars years after they began, but only after deadly attacks on America and Americans. Out of those experiences of the 20th century flowed the Cold War consensus that produced over a half-century of American global leadership.

But in the aftermath of the Cold War, as existential threats seemed for the moment to recede, American leadership metastasized into something else: a blind inability to distinguish vital from non-vital interests or militarily soluble problems from problems that cannot be solved by military means – with disastrous consequences for both American domestic and foreign policy. But there is a silver lining: The nature of the problem suggests that there is a better solution than simply abandoning America’s global position and its very real global interests.

The answer is not, as some might argue, to keep doing everything and simply spend more on defense. The answer is to return to a cold, clear appraisal of what problems American military power should be applied to and can be applied to fruitfully.

This will not be easy. Vocal lobbies within the Washington foreign policy establishment are heavily invested, professionally and emotionally, in applying U.S. military power to problems that are not military in nature and cannot be solved by military means. There remains an undisciplined impulse to engage American forces in brushfire wars and civil conflicts that do not impact vital American interests, a fetish for U.S. presence as a response to non-military “gray zone” activities, and a penchant for open-ended commitments to stabilizing chaotic, impoverished and ungoverned spaces.

These problems cannot be solved by the U.S. military, and in fact have not been solved despite the application of American forces and American money in copious quantities over the last 25 years. They can and do suck up money, readiness, and service members’ lives. Furthermore, they sap Americans’ faith in their leaders, government institutions, internationalist foreign policy, the efficacy of military spending, and more.

It is well past time to stop. A better approach is available. The U.S. military must be directed to focus on problems that can be solved using military force, in the places where American vital interests are clearly engaged. Put plainly: the military is first and foremost an instrument of warfare, of killing and destruction, and it must be prepared, with great violence and prejudice, to kill the troops and destroy the armaments of countries that would pursue military aggression against America’s closest partners in the Western Pacific and in Eastern Europe – or, if a country were so foolish, against the United States itself.

While the military can – and is often directed to – perform other functions, such as collecting intelligence or training and exercising with foreign partners, most such missions carry very real costs in time, money, and opportunities foregone. And in very few such cases can the United States achieve the decisive outcomes that it seeks unless it is prepared – and seen by enemies to be prepared – to commit its own forces to fight for them and to seek victory in pursuit of clearly defined military goals.

At worst, committing the U.S. military to goals for which it is not clearly willing to fight risks tempting the adversary to test American forces, American will, and American limits. As Garrett Mattingly wrote in his 1959 history of the Spanish Armada of the French king’s unwillingness to use force against an armed insurrection in his capital, “One does not wave a pistol under the nose of an armed enemy and then let him know it won’t go off.” Or, as senior officials were frequently quoted as asserting during the Obama administration, “superpowers don’t bluff.”

If that promise is to be given substance, then there is indeed a strong argument for focusing America’s military commitments on the physical defense of the United States’ vital interests in Asia and Europe. And vital interests they are. For these regions are home not only to America’s largest trading partners outside the Western Hemisphere (Canada and Mexico together account for approximately 30% of U.S. trade; Asia excluding China for approximately 25%; and Europe excluding Russia for approximately 20%; by comparison, China accounts for a little over 10% of U.S. trade), but also, perhaps more importantly, to the vast majority of the world’s prosperous democracies which broadly share America’s principles and worldview.

As Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote in 1950 on the creation of the alliance structures that remain cornerstones of our foreign policy today, the United States’ abandonment of those regions to control by hostile powers would give our adversaries “such a dominating position over so vast an area, population, and military and economic resources as would make our problems unmanageable,” and “would so change the spacious freedom of American life as to undermine its cultural, moral, political, and constitutional bases.”

The defense against attacks on America’s vital interests and the pursuit of victory in warfare are things the military can do if directed to focus on them, almost certainly at a price equal to or lower than what the United States pays today for “defense” against an endless array of ill-defined threats. Aligning the military’s missions with actual military problems might even restore the American people’s common-sense belief that their hard-earned money is being spent in their interest, and to good effect.

That would be a policy worth – and worthy of – the tax dollars of the American people and the commitments and sacrifices of its servicemen and women.

Ann Dailey is a policy researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution.

Having one individual responsible and accountable for both USCYBERCOM and the NSA has been the United States’ most critical advantage in cyberspace. Although this setup predates the 2010 creation of USCYBERCOM by six years, the military command’s formal establishment spurred debates over separating organizational leadership. Many talking points against a dual hat have not changed, and the Trump administration seems set on moving forward with an outdated view.

Operating in cyberspace is far more complex than it once was. Fighting today’s digital threats requires the fluid setting and resetting of network security through continuous cyber operations to sustain long-term initiative. In this environment of persistent engagement, the technical and operational requirements for military and intelligence efforts have largely converged. With similar lines of code used for network access and exploiting vulnerabilities, intelligence collection has become nearly indistinguishable from planting disruptive malware. Adversaries have long recognized this by blending military and intelligence activities in cyberspace.

Increased alignment between USCYBERCOM and the NSA also marks a significant change, and the dual hat has evolved to manage the resulting synergy. When USCYBERCOM initially gained footing, the arrangement managed the military’s reliance on the NSA and capability borrowing (i.e., vulnerabilities, exploits, and personnel) across organizations to meet separate operating pictures. That relationship looks very different today. The dual hat now balances overlapping resource requirements and the intermingling of military disruption with secretive intelligence collection. As USCYBERCOM and the NSA have become more symbiotic, the dual hat has adapted to leverage operational integration and enhance the organizations’ independent and joint effectiveness.

In grappling with these changes, dual-hatted leadership has created inter-organizational processes to increase effectiveness in cyberspace. For example, the Integrated Cyber Center and Joint Operations Center (ICC/JOC) launched in 2018 literally broke down walls. Previously, NSA and USCYBERCOM had operations centers in different classified rooms physically separated by a secure door. The ICC/JOC introduced a common operations floor with dedicated spaces for USCYBERCOM and NSA personnel. By eliminating barriers, the ICC/JOC created more communication at the operator level to achieve greater awareness, speed and impact.

Operational success has followed organizational change. Leveraging enhanced coordination from unified leadership, the joint USCYBERCOM-NSA Election Security Group task force has effectively combatted foreign interference in U.S. elections. Formed in 2020, it grew directly out of the dual hat’s Russia Small Group that disrupted Russian cyber meddling during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. Pooling resources for greater impact, while advocating for and protecting the distinct contributions of USCYBERCOM and the NSA, would be far more difficult under split leadership.

Separate leaders risk prioritizing their own organizational outcomes at the expense of operational speed and combined effectiveness. It is true that the dual hat does not eliminate all interagency competition over cyber operations. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) delayed USCYBERCOM’s 2016 offensive against the Islamic State with objections over the military’s interagency reporting and update requirements. The CIA and USCYBERCOM had already agreed on communication measures, so the delay was really about preserving bureaucratic influence. But it is equally true that, because the preponderance of cyber operations originates from Fort Meade, centralized authority preserves speed by preventing turf disputes and operational delays between independent USCYBERCOM and NSA heads.

Without the dual hat, USCYBERCOM-NSA coordination and dispute resolution become more cumbersome and subject to an unpredictable working relationship between chiefs with differing ranks. A four-star officer must lead USCYBERCOM; the NSA only requires a three-star chief. Currently, one four-star commander reports to both the defense secretary (as USCYBERCOM commander) and to the national intelligence director (as NSA director). With both military and intelligence roles, the dual hat efficiently balances tradeoffs in cyber operations while subjecting NSA activities to the law of armed conflict. With two different leaders, disputes would escalate to the White House for resolution, and the NSA faces greater risks of politicization in the process. A return to laborious interagency reviews would also negate the legacy of the first Trump administration, which reduced decision times for cyber operations.

The cost of splitting USCYBERCOM-NSA leadership would also create a nightmare for the Trump White House. Cyber Command lacks sufficient resources to operate fully independently from the NSA. Dividing authority will require duplicated efforts for USCYBERCOM to secure its own cyber resources in an already resource-scarce environment. Duplication would be particularly costly given declining budgets and spending power that demand better use of existing resources. It would also be a significant misstep for an administration focused on greater government efficiency.

Unwinding America’s military-intelligence leadership for cyber operations would be a gift to hackers in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. These adversaries will not wait for the U.S. to devise a new bureaucratic architecture. Instead, the new administration should build on the success of the dual hat. It has aligned USCYBERCOM and NSA effectiveness for combined impact with a unity of effort crucial for achieving the operational speed and scale needed to secure U.S. interests in cyberspace. The dual hat has been a defining feature of U.S. cyber operations, not a bug. The Trump administration should be wary of throwing away another 20 years of USCYBERCOM-NSA success.

Jason Blessing, Ph.D., is a research analyst at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. His research expertise focuses on cybersecurity as well as international partnerships. All views are his own and do not represent the views of the Institute. Follow him on LinkedIn and on X/Twitter @JasonABlessing.

I talked with two former prime ministers, a top national security adviser, a deputy defense minister, and others familiar with politics and national security. In this independent visit, I sought Ukrainian perspectives on the politics of the war and any efforts to end it.

Ukrainians were cautiously optimistic that President-elect Donald Trump was becoming more supportive. In early December in Paris, one leader said Trump had told President Volodymyr Zelensky that he would not abandon Ukraine. But Trump appeared to have no clear-cut plan to end the war. Trump, the leader added, also said NATO would not be available, but Zelensky said he would keep pressing for it.

Ukrainians saw other positive signs. One leader recalled that Trump was the first to provide lethal weapons (Javelin anti-armor missiles), and he opposed the Russian Nord Stream II gas pipeline. Trump would not want to preside over a failed negotiation, the leader surmised. If Friedrich Merz became Germany’s next Chancellor, another leader said, he and French President Emmanuel Macron would strengthen European leadership with more forceful support forUkraine.

Views differed on Ukraine’s military situation. One leader observed that in the failed 2023 counter-offensive, Ukraine lacked airpower, electronic warfare and air defense. A lot of capable people died. On the other hand, another leader said, Russia had failed to win the war at the outset, and it had lost a half-million personnel and half of its good officers. One leader assessed that to win the war, Ukraine would need a decisive advantage in drones.

Leaders said Ukraine could sustain its fight for perhaps another year or two. But, one leader stipulated, Ukraine would require a defensive strategy, with more fortifications and an end to offensives such as Kursk. Russians, with a large war economy and more people, might sustain a longer fight. They had a high tolerance for pain and could accept lower living standards.

Ukrainians voiced gratitude for Western support but also frustration. According to one leader, the West had provided only 30% of the weapons Ukraine needed. Ukraine could not mobilize more troops unless it could arm them properly. According to another leader, Ukraine could maintain morale if it sent new troops into battle in Bradley and Stryker armored vehicles, but not into the trenches poorly armed. The goal this year would be to stabilize the front and increase the scale of deep-strike bombing, a leader said.

Ukrainians did not expect NATO membership anytime soon, one leader commented. With its large, combat-tested forces and expanded defense industry, Ukraine would be potent asset for the alliance.

Prospects for a negotiated solution to the war were seen to be poor. Ukraine was not ready, one leader lamented, it needed to become stronger. Another said, all Ukrainians wanted the war to end and regretted giving up nuclear weapons to Russia, but Ukrainians did not want to give up an inch of their territory. If the West forced it, this would be like Munich in 1938. It would be the end of international law – force would have prevailed.

Potential negotiating positions were seen to be far apart. According to one leader, Putin would insist that Ukraine accept Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the four partially occupied regions in the east. And Ukraine would have to slash its armed forces, become neutral, and foreswear joining NATO. No Ukrainian leader could agree to this.

In any peace accord, a leader said, there could be no compromise on Ukraine’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, on the size or capability of its armed forces, and or on its ability to join the European Union and NATO. Ukraine would agree only to a just peace, one that deterred further aggression.

A negotiated peace or even just a ceasefire, leaders agreed, would require that Ukraine maintain its armed forces and be allowed to host European peacekeepers. They would have to be militarily credible, to help deter aggression. On Dec. 26, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov disparaged prospects for a ceasefire, calling it a “path to nowhere.”

Ukrainians emphasized good governance. Democracy and civil society remained vibrant even though martial law imposed some media limits, a leader said. Corruption persisted, but Ukraine had strong potential to attack it, aided by U.S.-backed anti-corruption institutions.

Ukrainians agreed that during the war unity was most important. Elections could take place afterward. Zelensky was said to be planning to run again. He or General Valerii Zaluzhny could lead a coalition government. Now ambassador to the U.K., Zaluzhny was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But one leader cautioned, “War is not an excuse to limit the role of the parliament.”

William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, and a Department of State senior adviser at the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission).

Selling out Ukraine by immediately cutting U.S. military aid would be consistent with Trump’s earlier effort last summer to block congressional approval of Ukraine aid for over six months. Trump took that decision in the context of the American election so that he would be seen as a peace candidate seeking to end a “forever war.”

But Trump has also criticized President Biden’s flawed withdrawal from Afghanistan, and abandoning Ukraine would lead to much worse consequences: upending the international order that we and our allies have relied upon since World War II; emboldening Putin to go after other former Soviet neighbors; and encouraging Xi Jinping to settle the Taiwan issue by force.

In Ukraine, long guns become desperate defenses against small drones

Geopolitics aside, Trump does not want to be seen by the world as a loser. That would hurt his image and complicate his ability to conduct his own foreign policy for the next four years.

So Trump should be working with the Ukrainians and U.S. allies to come up with another formula to end this war, one that the Godfather might approve of.

Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s nominee for Ukraine/Russia envoy, seems to realize the importance of generating leverage before negotiations begin. In fact, that is precisely the way Trump has always negotiated – from a position of strength. Earlier this month, the new NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, emphasized to NATO foreign ministers the need to strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating position before discussing the specific details of a ceasefire or peace deal.

After a decade of war, both sides are tired of fighting and may be more open to a negotiated solution, notwithstanding the lack of evidence that President Putin is ready to negotiate seriously on terms other than Ukraine’s capitulation.

The battlefield situation for Ukraine remained difficult but largely static throughout 2024. While Ukraine achieved some important successes, including its daring seizure of part of Kursk province in August, Russia has been pushing steadily westward in Donbas in recent weeks, albeit at the cost of some 1,500 casualties a day. It has recruited North Korean troops, set its economy on a war footing, and drawn increasingly on Chinese support.

Future negotiations would, at the broadest level, have two parts: territorial issues and security guarantees for Ukraine. The first may be easier to deal with than the second.

Given the battlefield situation and the likelihood it will remain fairly static in 2025, Ukraine may be willing to agree at least temporarily to continued de facto Russian occupation of some of its sovereign territory, as long as it retained the right to regain the territories diplomatically over the longer term.

Since Ukraine controls part of Kursk, it is in a position to barter with Putin over the details. Ukrainian President Zelensky has suggested a willingness to make some territorial compromises in return for assured long-term security for all unoccupied portions of Ukraine – using something akin to the West German model of NATO membership for non-occupied lands only.

North Korean troops killed fighting against Ukraine, Pentagon confirms

Longer-term security guarantees for Ukraine will be critical, but much more difficult to negotiate. Immediate NATO membership with full Article 5 protection would be ideal but is less likely under Trump. Clear bilateral defense and security commitments, much firmer than the failed 1994 Budapest Memorandum, will be needed in the short and medium term, preferably backed up by the deployment of some European forces on Ukrainian soil to deter any renewed Russian aggression. These peacekeepers may need to remain in place for several years, until NATO allies are ready to invite Ukraine to begin membership accession talks.

To get Putin to agree to such terms, Trump should threaten a NATO-wide surge of massive military aid to Ukraine for at least six months to a year if Putin does not acquiesce, to include lifting the caveats on use of U.S.-provided long-range strike systems. A similar surge proved useful in Iraq and could go hand in hand with a surge in sanctions.

Putin has been waiting for Trump’s election to recalculate his position in Ukraine. With a tough negotiating offer along these lines from Trump, there is some chance that Putin would cut his losses and declare victory. That should give Kyiv the added negotiating strength to settle the current war diplomatically, not with a clear victory but at least with a durable ceasefire and restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over most of its pre-invasion territory .

Trump may be more inclined to consider such a “last chance” proposal if it were accompanied by an offer by the European allies to assume a larger share of NATO’s defense burden – not just in supplying Ukraine but more broadly.

For example, a commitment by European allies to a new transatlantic compact under which they would provide more than 50 percent of the capabilities NATO needs for collective defense, and all the capabilities for non-Article 5 missions, would go a long way toward dispelling Trump’s belief that allies are hopeless slackers. It could be combined with a proposal to raise the NATO defense investment pledge from 2% to at least 3% of GDP.

The time has come for Europe to step up and assume an equal share of the responsibility for European security and defense. This would be the best way to convince Trump to continue to work in concert with U.S. allies by demonstrating that Europe is ready to do its part to secure a just peace for Ukraine and a more equal sharing of the burdens in NATO.

Alexander Vershbow is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior advisor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. He was U.S. ambassador to NATO and Russia, assistant secretary of defense, and NATO deputy secretary general.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was NSC senior director for defense policy, vice president of the National Defense University, and legislative director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Unlike the last 30 years, when U.S air bases were largely safe havens from enemy attacks, the document continues, “adversaries now possess high-end capabilities” that can threaten such installations.

This warning is correct, but it understates the threat.

In our new Stimson Center report, “Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to US Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific,” and co-authored with Jonathan Walker, we conclude that Chinese missile strikes could keep U.S. military runways and taxiways in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific islands closed in the critical first days — and even weeks — of a war between the United States and China.

Even if the United States undertook massive investments in a mix of active and passive countermeasures, runways and taxiways would remain closed for at least the first several days of any conflict.

Specifically, the United States would not be able to operate fighter aircraft from U.S. air bases in Japan for close to the first two weeks of a conflict, including from Kadena Air Base and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, located closest to the Taiwan Strait.

These are the only two locations from which U.S. fifth-generation fighters would be able to complete their missions and return to base without requiring aerial refueling. Most importantly, Chinese missiles could keep U.S. military runways in Japan closed to aerial refueling tankers — and the aircraft which depend on them for in-flight fuel — for over a month.

China’s growing reach could also keep U.S. air bases in Guam and other Pacific locations closed to tankers and bombers for at least the first four days of a conflict, and thereafter the United States would face other significant operational problems.

For example, low-flying and slow-moving tankers are already vulnerable to Chinese air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, but they would be especially easy for China to detect and shoot down when flying predictable flight routes from Guam and a handful of other Pacific bases.

Unfortunately, no single countermeasure — or even a combination of countermeasures — will be sufficient to counter runway attacks by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Our results validate the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment concept of dispersing U.S. aircraft and personnel more widely across multiple locations.

If the United States were to disperse to civilian airfields in the Pacific, as well as Japan Self Defense Force bases and civilian airfields in Japan, assuming it had the necessary political permissions, the shortest closure time would decline by over 70% in Japan, or three days for fighter operations and nine days for tanker operations. Within the Second Island Chain, closure times would drop only by about 10%, with runways opening on the fourth day.

These results, however, assume all personnel, equipment, and repair materials are available and ready for use at these other operating locations, which is not the case.

Even if Washington and Tokyo made these substantial investments, Chinese missiles would still keep aircraft grounded in the critical first days of a war, when the U.S. Air Force might be expected to quickly set up a combat air patrol or sink Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait.

Recently, senior Air Force leaders have emphasized the need to protect U.S. air bases in the Indo-Pacific with more robust missile defense capabilities, with Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall going so far as to suggest his service should take over this mission from the Army. Our findings suggest that even a massive buildup of U.S. missile defense capabilities is likely to fall short, however, even when combined with other countermeasures.

For example, even if the United States grew its Patriot missile defense force — expanding to 20 Patriot batteries and deployed them all to protect runways in Japan — China could still deny the use of these runways by fighters in the first two days of a war, and thereafter fighters would have to operate without any tanker support for another week.

Without tankers, these fighters would have to fly fewer sorties each day. The operational gains hardly seem to justify the costs, especially because China could easily offset these investments by increasing its missile stocks.

Instead, the United States will need to outthink — not outspend — China. Doing so requires the Air Force to prioritize the air denial mission within the First Island Chain, including building an inside air force around large numbers of runway-independent platforms and drones of various types and different ranges.

Over time, as the Chinese missile threat dissipates, the United States could bring forward more traditional crewed aircraft, including advanced fighters and the tankers required to support them, and transition to air superiority and offensive strike missions. To make that happen, however, the Air Force will need to move more rapidly toward uncrewed and autonomous systems, preposition equipment and munition stockpiles, and prepare to prioritize air denial in the initial air war.

Kelly Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center, an adjunct professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and a nonresident fellow at the Brute Krulak Center of the Marine Corps University.

Hunter Slingbaum is a junior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.