The federal office expects to sign the contract for the ground-to-air missile batteries in the third quarter of 2025, with procurement taking place as part of the European Sky Shield Initiative, Armasuisse said in a statement.

Swiss lawmakers last year approved a credit guarantee of 660 million Swiss francs ($809 million) for medium-range air defense in the 2024 armament program. Switzerland joins countries across Europe rushing to bolster their air defenses, as Russia’s daily missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities have raised awareness of the need to protect civilian and military targets against aerial threats.

“The future ground-based air defense will contribute to the impact of maintaining air sovereignty and air defense as well as protecting against attacks with long-range weapons,” Armasuisse said. The system will be part of Switzerland’s integrated air defense, the office said.

Armasuisse tested Hensoldt’s TRML-4D radar for the new medium-range air-defense system between March 31 and April 11, taking a further step in the procurement process, the office said.

The properties of the radar were tested together with Diehl and Hensoldt in the specific Swiss topography, with the radar used to detect aircraft including the PC-12, F/A-18 and helicopters, Armasuisse said.

Switzerland is one of the most mountainous countries in Europe, with mountains covering 70% of the territory and around a quarter of the surface area made up of peaks over 2,000 meters (6,562 feet) above sea level.

The tests also investigated the frequency compatibility with civilian systems such as weather radar.

The country in October joined the European Sky Shield Initiative as the program’s 15th member, with an initial focus on medium-range air defense, while saying it expected opportunities for cooperation on shorter and longer-range defenses in the future.

Other IRIS-T SLM users include Germany and Ukraine, while Latvia ordered the system in November 2023 and Slovenia and Bulgaria placed orders last year. A system typically includes a fire-control unit, a radar unit and multiple missile launchers.

“The renewal will close an existing gap in capability in the defense of stand-off weapons, to combat approaching targets at a medium distance and thus expand long-range ground-based air defense with the Patriot system,” Armasuisse said. “Systems currently in use will soon reach the end of their useful life.”

Separately, Diehl said it signed a partnership agreement with Denmark’s MDSI to expand the payload integration of IRIS-T short-range missiles on fighter aircraft. The missile is included in the standard armament of the Eurofighter and Saab’s Gripen, and can also be used on the F-16, Tornado, EF-18, KF-21 and F-5E, according to Diehl.

“By partnering with MDSI, we’re enabling air forces to leverage the full potential of our missile system across platforms previously deemed as of limited compatibility,” said Martin Walzer, senior manager for integration programs at Diehl.

Taipei is aware of the threat posed by Beijing’s forces forces, but officials acknowledge more must be done to deter and, if need be, fight an invasion. That message was prominently included in the Chinese-language Quadrennial Defense Review, published last month, now available as an English translation.

“Training courses and intensity will be increased to enrich combat skills of troops at all levels, and enhance their immediate combat-readiness capabilities,” the document states.

A Defense News reporter has witnessed Taiwanese training events on multiple occasions, which often resembled formulaic and choreographed drills divorced from the fog of war in modern warfare.

A lack of realism has also been fingered as a problem by U.S. observers and advisors.

Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, told Defense News that the QDR’s aspiration for better training amounts to an important self-criticism.

“Training is a huge area of needed progress,” he noted. “This is going hand in hand with U.S. willingness to liberalize past political boundaries and support expanded training on Taiwan and in the States.”

Randall Schriver, chairman of the U.S.-based Project 2049 Institute, testified to the U.S. Senate in late March that Washington must do more in training Taiwan’s forces.

“That was taboo for decades, and now we’re getting them to a point where they’re more professional, more proficient, as they’re placing a greater emphasis on training,” he told senators.

The QDR listed ways of improving the situation, such as “realistic combat training which is carried out in a force-on-force, on-site and real-time manner.” The review said this is necessary “in response to the enemy’s diversified threats and rapid changes in battlefields.”

One example of China’s evolving tactics was the introduction of new landing barges, exposed in satellite imagery in January. These mobile bridges were employed in a People’s Liberation Army (or PLA) exercise on a Guangdong beach in mid-March.

The innovative devices help military vehicles and supplies move rapidly from ship to shore.

Andrew Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, warned: “Make no mistake: China’s new bridge-barges are purpose-built for a Taiwan invasion scenario.”

By aligning three landing bridges in a row, a 900-yard-long causeway is created, allowing civilian or naval vessels to berth and unload equipment straight onto beaches.

Erickson explained this unique platform “may represent the missing piece in the puzzle for China to be able to attempt to deploy ferry-delivered, follow-on forces in support of an amphibious assault to the most advantageous locations along Taiwan’s coastline”.

Due to terrain and environmental conditions, the Project 2049 Institute previously identified just 14 Taiwanese beaches suitable for large-scale amphibious landings. However, these new bridge-barges expand the number of potential landing sites, complicating the equation for Taiwanese defense planners.

Taiwan’s defense review urged the armed forces to “construct realistic battlefield environments for joint training and exercises, force-on-force drills, and live-fire shooting practices to validate their results under near realistic combat conditions”.

Last year, Taiwan raised its conscription period from four to twelve months, citing “enemy threats.” Low morale and personnel retention remain problematic, however, something to which poor training contributes.

Conscripts were once lucky to receive a full magazine of bullets to fire during their national service, but the QDR promises they will now also learn how to operate complex weapons such as man-portable air defense missiles, drones and antitank rockets.

Despite such weaknesses, Hammond-Chambers said the latest QDR “grapples with the totality of the threat.”

He believes Taiwan is taking the PLA threat seriously enough. For example, “Defense spending has doubled in the past eight years, and the level of support from the U.S. too has improved in many areas, if not all.”

In terms of Taiwan preparedness, he noted there are “real bright spots, such as deterring a kinetic invasion. But in areas such as gray zone, blockade and critical infrastructure, there is much work to be done.”

Taiwan’s military has an immediate opportunity to demonstrate training improvements, after this year’s major Han Kuang exercise commenced on April 5. This fortnight-long tabletop drill contrasts with last year’s eight-day program.

Maj. Gen. Tung Chi-hsing, director of the Ministry of National Defense’s joint operations planning division, said the wargames have created scenarios in which frequent PLA military exercises escalate into a real attack on Taiwan.

The live-fire segment of Han Kuang will take place July 8-18, and this will see 20,000 reservists mobilized, up from 14,000 last year.

“Something is not working,” Trappier said in a hearing of the National Assembly defense committee here on Wednesday. “So it needs to be reviewed. It’s not up to me to do that, it’s up to the states to get together to figure out how to better manage this ambitious program.”

France, Germany and Spain in December 2022 awarded Dassault Aviation, Airbus, Indra Sistemas and Eumet a €3.2 billion ($3.6 billion) contract for phase 1B of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), covering research, technology and overall design. That’s after Dassault and Airbus reached agreement on the next-generation fighter earlier that month, after more than a year of squabbling.

Dassault is the prime contractor for the new generation fighter or NGF at the heart of the combat system, with Airbus the main partner on behalf of Germany and Spain. After the development phase, the next step will be building a demonstrator in phase 2, which France has previously said would be announced in 2026, for a first flight scheduled in 2029.

Wrangling between the partners over how to share the workload is causing delays, and reaching agreement on Phase 2 “is still going to take time, that’s for sure,” according to Trappier.

The French executive is typically outspoken, and has previously criticized how work on FCAS is organized. He has previously commented on working with Airbus, saying in a parliamentary hearing in May 2023 that FCAS was difficult with three partners, though the executive said at the time he was “very confident in our capability to jointly develop a demonstrator.”

In a response to his new testimony this week, Airbus said the FCAS program has made “strong progress,” including the concept selection review achievement within the phase 1B contract. “We are now on our way to phase 2 contracts,” the company said in an emailed statement to Defense News.

“We are committed to FCAS, which represents the backbone of the European defense industry and strategic autonomy,” Airbus said. “We do believe in FCAS as a collaborative European industrial program, even more so in the current geopolitical context. That is our commitment from the beginning, to pursue a system of systems that goes beyond a future European fighter.”

Meanwhile, Germany’s new government said this week it plans to swiftly continue development of FCAS, according to the coalition agreement between the conservative CDU/CSU and the center-left SPD.

Trappier said the fragmented work methodology of FCAS is a cause of delays, as “each time we reopen pointless, endless discussions” with a push for more co-development and cooperation. Trappier said he disagrees with that model, and focus should be on prioritizing the best skills.

While Dassault is the prime contractor, the French company weighs for only a third in decision making, with Airbus having two-thirds of the vote on behalf of Germany and Spain, Trappier said. That means the lead company on the NGF can’t divvy up the work as it sees fit, the CEO complained.

“We have to constantly accommodate, constantly negotiate. It’s what’s called permanent negotiation. I hope we will reach an agreement to move forward,” he said.

Calculations on the shape of the future aircraft have been completed, “we know how to manufacture it, get it flying as quickly as possible,” the CEO said. “I would be very much in favor of speeding things up.”

Trappier mentioned the French-led nEUROn drone project as an example of what cooperation should look like, with six countries successfully developing an “ultra stealthy” combat drone on a tight budget. The CEO said Dassault as manager of the program didn’t compromise on the product for the sake of “geo return,” the practice of guaranteeing nations a work share proportional to their investment, which Trappier called “absolutely deadly for setting up a European cooperation.”

While cooperation was successful on nEUROn, “we don’t have that today on the NGF and I’m very sorry about that,” the executive said. He said Dassault finds itself alone against two partners, having to “persuade even more in order to reach decisions. It just takes a little more time.”

Trappier said some FCAS partners such as Thales are leaders in the field of defense electronics due to France’s history of seeking strategic autonomy, “so when you implement the geo return at every phase, it’s difficult.”

Meanwhile, when Dassault Aviation wants to work with German partners, certain technology derived from the Eurofighter is off-limits unless something “high-level” is provided in return, according to Trappier.

“Well, that doesn’t work. So we’re constantly bumping into these difficulties of work share,” he told lawmakers.

Dassault Aviation makes France’s Rafale fighter, while Airbus builds the Eurofighter in use in Germany and Spain. Both aircraft have roots in a multinational collaboration in the early 1980s on a future European fighter, with France opting to go it alone on the Rafale after disagreements over design authority and operational requirements.

France wants a next-generation aircraft capable of fulfilling the nuclear-deterrence role, able to perform its missions “without any constraints from any foreign country whatsoever,” and anything else would be a reason to stop the FCAS program, according to Trappier. The French fighter also needs to be able to operate from an aircraft carrier.

Trappier said that if France chooses a path of mutual dependency with allies, “there’s no going back,” an argument that may resonate with French lawmakers attached to the country’s policy of strategic autonomy in defense matters.

“We have to weigh what we are giving up to our allies, which may be normal in European cooperation and in a desire for European integration,” Trappier said. “But that also means we will depend on each other.”

Trappier was asked whether Dassault could go it alone should the FCAS program fail, and be able to provide France with a stealth-capable aircraft within a reasonable time frame.

“I don’t want to sound arrogant at all, but whose capabilities do I need other than my own to make a combat aircraft?” Trappier said. “So I’m willing to cooperate and share. I’m not against it, but I’m the one with the skills.”

Trappier said the future fighter doesn’t compete with the Rafale, which will operate alongside the new air combat system at some point. FCAS will be for beyond the 2040s, “more like 2045,” the CEO said.

Dassault is working on the future F5 standard for Rafale for 2030-2035, with a focus on connectivity and networking, and plans for a stealthy combat drone based on nEUROn as a loyal wingman.

“What we are trying to look at next is how we could make a future combat aircraft. Who with, that’s the question.”

The French state is committed to cooperation on FCAS to free up more resources and to contribute to “a slightly more united Europe,” Trappier said. “The problem is that when it comes down to the nitty gritty of the contracts, it’s more complicated.”

“We will do the NGF, as for with who, that’s not for me to answer,” Trappier said. “That’s up to the state, up to the politicians to say whether we should work with our traditional allies or not.”

He told lawmakers that if the future combat aircraft is produced as it is conceived today, with three partners, “Rafale will seem cheap to you.”

France in January 2024 announced the purchase of 42 Rafale jets for more than €5 billion, or a cost of at least €119 million per aircraft.

French President Emmanuel Macron said in March he intends to order more Rafale fighters, with plans for two squadrons at the air base of Luxeuil-Saint-Saveur, which currently doesn’t host the aircraft.

Trappier said Dassault would welcome additional French orders, though the company hasn’t received any yet.

Britain said that in a joint effort with Norway just over $580 million would be spent to provide hundreds of thousands of military drones, radar systems and anti-tank mines, as well as repair and maintenance contracts to keep Ukrainian armored vehicles on the battlefield.

On the eve of the meeting in Brussels, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said a key issue was strengthening his country’s air defenses. “Ukraine needs a sufficient number of modern systems like Patriot” missile systems, he said in a post on social media.

“A political decision is needed to supply these systems to protect our cities, towns, and the lives of our people — especially from the threat of Russian ballistic weapons. Our partners have such available systems,” Umerov said.

Russian forces hold the advantage in Ukraine, with the war now in its fourth year. Ukrainian officials and military analysts believe Russia is preparing to launch a fresh military offensive in coming weeks to ramp up pressure and strengthen the Kremlin’s hand in ceasefire talks.

Friday’s meeting is the 27th gathering of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. It’s being chaired by Britain and Germany.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will be absent from a forum that the United States created and led for several years, although he was due to take part via video.

Hegseth spent the first part of this week in Panama and returned to Washington on Wednesday night.

“The troops that we have in the Republic of Korea are responsible wholly for preserving peace on the peninsula and in the region,” Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, who also serves as head of Combined Forces Command, told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday.

“They are a critical component to ballistic missile defense in the region. They are critical to helping Indo-Pacific Command see, sense and understand threats to the north and to deter a great many adversaries.”

Currently, roughly 28,500 U.S. military personnel are stationed in South Korea, working with both regional military partners and United Nations countries. The Defense Department has had at least 25,000 American troops deployed continuously there since the early 1950s.

Top general recommends US maintain current troop levels in Europe

But Trump and his advisers have questioned the value of the long-term presence of American military forces at a number of overseas locations. During an Oval Office ceremony on Wednesday, Trump was asked about reducing the number of American troops stationed in Europe, and injected Korea into his answer.

“We pay for U.S. military in Europe, and we don’t get reimbursed by much. South Korea, too,” he said. “It will be one of the things that we discuss that is unrelated to trade, but we’ll make it part of the trade conversation. It would be nice to wrap it all up together.”

At the start of Thursday’s hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed, D-R.I., noted “there are rumors that the Defense department will direct a reduction of U.S. presence in South Korea, or retask these forces to focus on the threat from China” instead of North Korea.

Brunson did not address any of the force level change discussions directly, but said that from a military strategy standpoint, “we need to remember there is diplomacy and defense on the Korean Peninsula currently.”

He urged “strategic clarity” with any changes in force posture in the region, to ensure allies and adversaries understand America’s commitment to stability in the region.

Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told lawmakers at the hearing that the forces stationed in Korea benefit not only that country but also numerous other allies in the region.

“They make significant contributions outside the Korean peninsula, including in their participation in multilateral exercises,” he said.

Defense Department officials have not announced any formal plans to begin force reductions or significant posture changes in the region. Trump did not provide any additional details on when a review of troop levels in Europe or the Pacific may begin.

The ships represent Turkey’s first corvette export to the Asia-Pacific region and will support Malaysia’s ability to carry out a variety of maritime defense missions including anti-surface, anti-air, asymmetric and electronic warfare.

Based on the ADA-class design, the three corvettes are scheduled for delivery by the end of 2027.

STM, the main contractor, is responsible for the design, construction, integration, and delivery of the vessels, as well as logistics support. The ships are being tailored to meet Royal Malaysian Navy requirements and will be constructed in Turkey with the involvement of local defense firms.

The LMS Batch-2 ships will feature a stealthy hull with a low radar cross-section and high maneuverability. With a displacement of approximately 2,500 tons, each vessel will measure 99.5 meters in length and reach speeds over 26 knots. Powered by a CODAD propulsion system with four diesel engines, the ships will have a range exceeding 4,000 nautical miles at cruising speed and an endurance of 14 days. They will accommodate a crew of 111 and support helicopter operations with a hangar and refueling capabilities.

The corvettes will be equipped with an Italian Leonardo 76mm main gun, one Aselsan Smash 30mm secondary gun, Roketsan Atmaca surface-to-surface and South Korean Haegung surface-to-air missiles, decoy launchers, and electronic warfare systems. Their combat systems include a 3D surveillance radar, IFF, electro-optical fire control radar, target designation sights, and a combat management system provided by Havelsan.

The LMS Batch-2 project follows the June 2024 signing of a government-to-government defense agreement between Turkey and Malaysia, with steel cutting for the ships taking place last December.

“We certainly respect the sovereignty of the Panamanians,” Hegseth said before departing the country back to Washington.

Earlier Wednesday, Hegseth faced questions in a press conference about the two countries’ joint statement following their meetings Tuesday. Panama’s version included a line about its sovereignty over the canal; America’s didn’t, though it discussed working through Panama’s constitution, which affirms authority over the canal itself.

The impasse brought back concern that the U.S. was reneging on its agreement ceding the canal to Panamanian control, finalized in 1999 after a 20-year handover.

Trump has disparaged that deal and said multiple times that America would take the canal back — even saying in a March address to Congress that the U.S. was already “reclaiming” the waterway.

Panama’s President Raul Mulino publicly denied the claims and referred to them as an insult on the country’s dignity.

Hegseth vows US will ‘take back’ Panama canal from Chinese influence

Hegseth’s visit this week worked to calm any such tension. In carefully planned remarks, he referenced Panama’s value as a partner and its long history with the U.S., including on building the canal in the early 1900s. He also signed agreements to increase America’s military work with the country through further training and rotating in more U.S. forces and equipment.

“He acknowledged the sovereignty of Panama over the Panama Canal,” Frank Abrego, Panama’s minister of public security, said of Hegseth at the press conference.

Speaking to traveling press on the flight back to Washington, senior defense officials didn’t specify how many further American troops would enter the country, nor give a timeline for their arrival. They also didn’t elaborate on plans Hegseth previewed to renew Fort Sherman, the U.S. military’s now-abandoned jungle fighting school in the country.

Any further dispatch of U.S. troops to Panama would first require consensus with Panama’s government, said one of the defense officials, allowed to speak anonymously to describe the agreement.

In return, Panama’s government expressed interest in American help protecting the canal from cyberattacks and surveilling it.

The U.S. once had a large military presence inside Panama, though it was drawn down heavily during the canal handover. The number of American troops in the country now rises and falls from a few dozen to a couple hundred, depending on exercises and training programs.

In late 1989, America’s military launched a two-month operation to depose Panama’s then-President Manuel Noriega. The invasion has left scars for many in the country today, wary of U.S. coercion and, perhaps, another attack.

“There’s extraordinary sensitivities at hand,” the first defense official said, noting that any suggestion — by China or America — of infringing on Panama’s sovereignty over the canal is a “non-starter” in the country.

At the same time, the officials said, the Trump administration is increasingly concerned about the drift of Panama, and Latin America as a whole, toward what it calls “China’s malign influence.”

China’s government has vastly expanded its trade and investment relationship with the region, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure program American officials say includes predatory lending practices.

On the trip, Hegseth added a clause to Trump’s pledge to take the canal back, soothing concerns that the U.S. military was developing plans to seize the waterway, reported by multiple outlets in March.

“Together, we are going to take back the canal from China’s influence,” Hegseth said.

Mulino pulled Panama from the Belt and Road Initiative this February, the same month U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made an earlier visit to the country. Hegseth mentioned his respect for Mulino’s leadership multiple times on the trip, and the secretary’s team described the president as a long-term partner.

The Trump administration has said the U.S. will focus more intently on Latin America, including through the American military, which surged troops and warships for immigration missions since January.

In turn, Hegseth repeatedly called the Panama Canal “key terrain” and affirmed America’s commitment to maintain its access to it — repeated in the two countries’ joint statement.

Around 40% of U.S. container traffic passes through the Panama Canal each year alongside about 100 American Navy vessels, a number that would surely increase if a war began in the Pacific.

The French Directorate General for Armament is looking to identify the technical solutions that will enable a demonstration firing in a year’s time, the defense-procurement agency told Defense News in a written reply to questions.

The DGA is working with a consortium of Safran and MBDA and another of Thales and ArianeGroup to develop a tactical strike capability in the 150 kilometer (93 mile) range.

Time is running out for France to replace its Lance-Roquettes Unitaire, a modified version of the M270 multiple launch rocket system, with the Army’s nine remaining systems set to reach the end of their service life in 2027.

Lawmakers and military brass have been pushing to develop a domestic option rather than buy abroad, in line with French policy for autonomy in defense matters.

“Service withdrawal of the LRU is approaching, and retention of the capability will be an issue at that point,”said Léo Péria-Peigné, a researcher at the Paris-based Institut Français des Relations Internationales specializing in armament capacity.

“The urgency is relative – we have hardly ever used this capacity in the past 30 years.”

Safran and MBDA are on track for the “ambitious” DGA schedule, confirming their target for a test firing in mid-2026, they said in a joint statement to Defense News. Thales and ArianeGroup didn’t comment on timing, with Thales saying the companies have been working as an integrated team for several months to offer a “pertinent solution” for the armed forces.

France’s 2024-2030 defense spending plan has budgeted €600 million ($663 million) for the rocket-artillery program, called Frappe Longue Portée Terrestre or FLP-T for short, with a goal of buying at least 13 systems by 2030 and 26 systems to equip a battalion by 2035.

The schedule to replace the LRU “is proceeding nominally” and within the timetable set by the defense spending law, according to the DGA.

Meanwhile, there’s still the option of a foreign purchase if things end up taking to long. That decision is on the calendar for next year, the directorate said.

German rocket artillery pick tests the waters on US arms dependence

The long-range tactical strike capability is “essential” and a niche that needs to be filled, French Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pierre Schill told lawmakers in an October hearing, noting that many other European countries have a rocket artillery capability.

Europe lacks a home-made HIMARS equivalent, and European armies shopping for rocket artillery in recent years either picked the U.S. option, the PULS launcher by Israel’s Elbit Systems, or Hanwha Aerospace’s Chunmoo.

Elbit is working with KNDS on a Europeanized version of PULS, while Germany’s Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin in 2023 joined forces to develop the GMARS system.

Other than France, European countries still in the market for rocket artillery include Sweden and Norway. The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Spain already picked PULS, Poland acquired Chunmoo and HIMARS, while the Baltic countries, Romania and Italy are HIMARS customers. Meanwhile, the U.K. is considering expanding its fleet of M270 multiple launch rocket systems.

That leaves a narrow commercial window for French-developed rocket artillery, though a push by the European Union’s executive arm for member states to spend more of their defense budgets within the 27-nation bloc may provide a tailwind for a European solution.

Safran and MBDA said their rocket-artillery system, dubbed Thundart, is based on “mature and mastered subsystems,” and an initial operational capability could be produced before 2030.

In the already saturated marketplace, “there will be no export market for a French system that will not be ready before 2030,” said Péria-Peigné.

The DGA signed innovation partnerships with the two consortiums in November, providing a first round of financing for the FLP-T program. The partnership contract allows the procurement office to buy the system at the end of the development phase without a new competitive tender, provided the armament meets performance requirements.

The innovation partnership includes a “significant degree of self-financing” by industry, Safran Electronics & Defense CEO Franck Saudo said in a parliamentary hearing in November.

Each consortium will carry out a firing of its demonstrator, after which the French government will make a choice, the DGA said. At the end of the current 18-month contracts, the consortiums will submit a proposal that will allow the government to choose between various solutions, including off-the-shelf equipment, according to the directorate.

DGA head Emmanuel Chiva had told the Sénat foreign affairs committee in November that if the industrial partners would “work well,” the first orders might be placed in late 2025 or early 2026. That now appears to have been pushed back by several months.

Safran and MBDA said the geopolitical context and changing artillery requirements reinforce the interest of a sovereign solution for France in particular, but also for other European countries, with Thundart the only rocket artillery system designed and built in Europe, free of U.S. arms-trade restrictions, and with independent manufacturing that provides control over the production pace.

The companies started working together on designing the new system at the end of 2023, and presented a mock-up of their Thundart 227 mm long-range guided-artillery rocket at the Eurosatory defense show in June 2024, as a first step in the FLP-T program. The rocket has 150-kilometer accuracy, according to Matthieu Krouri, MBDA’s head of land combat systems.

MBDA has production capacity adapted to the size of the tactical munitions required in France’s Centre-Val de Loire region, where final assembly will take place, the companies said. For its part, Safran has “strongly” increased production of AASM Hammer guided bombs, which have a guidance kit “very similar” to that of the Thundart munition, according to the consortium.

“Safran and MBDA are convinced of the relevance of this solution and have already invested heavily in this project,” the companies said. “The collaboration between Safran and MBDA on Thundart is a long-term project, which is already well advanced.”

Meanwhile, Thales and ArianeGroup teams are “fully mobilized” to propose a sovereign fire-support system that can deal with high-value targets, either surface or point targets, Thales said, without providing further details.

The new system will replace nine M270s on a Bradley tracked chassis, one of the rare pieces of U.S.-origin combat equipment still serving with the French Army, whose force is built around French-developed and manufactured tanks, armored vehicles and tube artillery.

Replacing the decades-old LRU is a priority for the army, according to the 2025 defense budget, with a sovereign solution preferred as long as it can be achieved rapidly and with controlled costs.

Army engineers may be able extend the lifespan of the LRU by another two to three years, but not much longer, according to Péria-Peigné at IFRI.

The goal of a sovereign solution had “not been abandoned,” French Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Thierry Burkhard told a National Assembly hearing in October.

Chiva said in November the LRU replacement “must be sovereign, and we are working towards this,” with the project taking some time due to the need to define Army requirements and “a certain confusion” in the requests.

The urgency of the capacity requirement may dictate having to turn to a foreign system after all, National Assembly special budget rapporteur Christophe Plassard said in October.

At the same time, HIMARS may not be a solution, as stress on production lines means delivery of the U.S system might not be possibly starting in 2027, the National Assembly’s defense committee wrote in an evaluation of the 2025 defense budget published in October.

“There is internal tension between supporters of the off-the-shelf solution and those in favor of national development,” Péria-Peigné said.

The military planning law calls for a system that could have a longer range than the LRU, in particular by allowing integration of hypersonic missiles with a range of several hundreds of kilometers. The DGA has asked both consortiums to study the cost and feasibility of including a future operational capability for strikes at ranges of 500 kilometers and 1,000 kilometers.

The rocket-artillery project is separate from the European Long-range Strike Approach, which concerns strikes at a distance of several thousands of kilometers, Burkhard said in November. Still, the envisaged future development of the FLP-T project has “strong adherence” with ELSA, according to the DGA.

Development of a long-range land-based strike capability beyond 1,000 kilometers is less urgent, with systems not expected until the 2030-2035 time frame, according a supplement to the 2025 defense budget discussing preparation for the future. Studies on strategic long-range strike were ongoing based on solutions proposed by ArianeGroup and MBDA, according to the October report.

MBDA has proposed its Land Cruise Missile, a land-based version of its company’s Missile de Croisière Naval, as a short-term solution for ELSA.

“The military-to-military relationships, especially with my counterparts that I deal with on a routine basis …it’s business as usual,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman told reporters during a briefing at the Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Colorado. “We’re still discussing the same challenges we had. … We’re still working the same basic collaborative issues that we’ve been working.”

Saltzman’s comments come as U.S. aid for Kiev’s defense has slowed and the Defense Department is moving troops away from a Ukraine support hub in Poland. In early March, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency temporarily froze Ukraine’s access to key satellite imagery amid a broader DOD pause on military aid to the country.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has also urged Europe to invest more domestic funding in national security and rely less on U.S. support. At the same time, U.S. officials have said they want the European Union to continue to buy weapons from American companies.

Saltzman noted that much of the Space Force’s engagement with European partners comes through NATO and the service’s commitment to information sharing with allied nations. Broader decisions around support for Ukraine and U.S. troop levels in Europe are outside of the Space Force’s scope or responsibility.

In the same briefing, Air Marshal Paul Godfrey, the Space Force’s assistant chief of space operations for future concepts and partnerships, said the service and its partners recognize Space Force support to allied nations with nascent military space capabilities and organizations is crucial.

“If we just cut ties, let Europe get on with it, then they’re going to have to spend significant amounts of money, potentially go down dead-ends, developing the sort of capabilities that the U.S. has put together over decades,” he said.

That message undergirds a new international partnerships strategy the Space Force expects to roll out in the coming weeks. Saltzman previewed the document Wednesday during a speech at the symposium.

“Our international partnership strategy is built on one key concept: Coalition operations will be far more successful if we work together well before those contingency operations become necessary,” he said. “We’re not tightly coupled in our training, if we’re not reconciling our operational concepts, if we’re not integrating our capabilities, we will have a very steep learning curve when called upon in crisis or conflict.”

The strategy’s three main goals are to leverage individual nations’ unique expertise, improve information sharing and interoperability and integrate across the spectrum of operations — from force design to employment of capabilities.

Saltzman said the Space Force wants to embed more allies into its planning processes and acquisition strategies, expand joint exercises and coordinate personnel exchanges that allow partners to learn from one another.

He also emphasized that the strategy does not view partnership in space as a one-way street, but instead recognizes that all nations have something to contribute.

“The trick is in focusing on areas where we have a comparative advantage,” he said. “Maybe it’s space domain awareness or hosted payloads. Maybe it’s launch capacity or even simple geography for a ground station. I firmly believe that every contribution can make a meaningful impact on space security.”

Saltzman and Godfrey told reporters they’ve been floating the draft strategy to foreign partners this week at Space Symposium and will discuss it in greater depth Thursday as Saltzman hosts a gathering of international space chiefs representing around 20 different nations.

Then on Friday, the 10 nations who are members of the Space Force’s Combined Space Operations initiative will meet to discuss partnership opportunities for the coming year.

The agency now oversees five core tasks – up from three – including joint procurement facilitation and defense innovation coordination, the agency said in its annual report, released this week. The update follows a May 2024 landmark Long-Term Review endorsed by EU defense ministers, who pledged to increase collaborative spending amid concerns over industrial fragmentation and technological gaps.

EU defense expenditure was projected to have reached €326 billion, or $361 billion, in 2024 (1.9% of GDP), a 30% increase since 2021. Almost a third (31%) now flows to defense investments, primarily the procurement of new equipment.

Nonetheless, Europe still spends less than 0.05% of its GDP on defense research and technology – a fraction of U.S. and Chinese investments. “Buying together saves money, while developing assets together makes us more independent,” said Jiří Šedivý, the Agency’s chief executive, last December.

The agency’s expanded role includes managing around 200 projects worth €681 million, from the Low Earth Orbit satellite demonstrator to the multinational procurement of 155 mm artillery shells for Ukraine. Ten countries have ordered over €350 million worth of ammunition through EDA’s fast-track mechanism, with first deliveries reaching Kyiv in May 2024.

“The European defence base remains fragmented, characterised by a lack of joint procurement and national preferences for defence spending.  This results in small, localised markets with relatively low production numbers,” Šedivý told a February 2025 European Economic and Social Committee forum. One of the EDA’s key objectives is to neutralize this European disadvantage and instead play to the Union’s strengths.

The joint procurement of weapons is one example of this, and an entirely new dimension to the EU’s capabilities that would have been unthinkable until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was formalized as one of the EDA’s tasks in May 2024. Brussels’s joint purchase of shells was the first time that the bloc had jointly made an arms purchase.

Since 2022, the European Union has become more assertive in the defense space and has made decisive moves towards increasing Brussels’ role in military matters. Just last month, EU leaders greenlit a new defense spending scheme.

Closer collaboration with Switzerland, Norway, Ukraine, and the United States – albeit based on pre-Trump trends – was also in the cards, according to the EDA report.

Four landmark letters of intent were facilitated by the European Defence Agency last year. The flagship amongst them—literally—is an agreement to develop a common European combat vessel by 2040. The ECV is meant to “protect trade routes to ensure the uninterrupted flow of goods to and from EU territory,” the Agency said in its report.

The other three big new projects cover loitering munitions, electronic warfare and an integrated air and missile defense for the continent, with the Agency working to coordinate procurement and conduct research into disruptive technologies to give Europe a leg up on threats only just beginning to emerge.

Despite the increase in scope and subsequent back-patting in its annual self-assessment, some challenges do remain for the EDA. For one, the EU’s stated goal to make 35% of all defense procurements collaboratively is likely still ambitious, with the most recent numbers from 2021 putting it at 18%.

“The urge to swiftly address capability shortfalls through readily available military equipment has led to a surge of national off-the-shelf acquisitions, causing a temporary slowdown of collaborative procurement,” the EDA wrote in its end-of-2024 report last December.

As the Agency prepares to move into its brand new, purpose-built Brussels headquarters by 2027, its test will be converting ministerial declarations into deployable capabilities. With the European Defence Fund allocating €1 billion for 2025 R&D projects – including AI-enabled systems and dual-use technologies – the agency will see growing importance, but also increased pressure to deliver strategically relevant results.

“As Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine enters its fourth year, the need for a strong, resilient, and coordinated European defence is greater than ever,” Šedivý said in his recap of the past year. The EU must be able to defend itself, he added -- “alone, if necessary. This new era demands bold decisions and action.”

British tabloids made the allegations after reports that the M-346 was being considered as a replacement for aging BAE Hawk T1 jets flown by the U.K.’s Red Arrows display team.

Leonardo worked jointly on the design of a jet trainer with Russian firm Yakovlev from 1993 to 2000 before the team-up was dissolved and each firm went on to produce their own trainers.

That did not stop the UK Sun newspaper reporting the M-346 was “Russian designed” in an article titled “Air Farce” on Monday. The daily quoted James Cartlidge, the defense spokesman for the UK’s Conservative opposition party saying, “When the Red Arrows perform their brilliant air displays, their red, white and blue vapor trails represent the Union Jack — not the Russian tricolor.”

As other tabloids picked up the story, British prime minister Keir Starmer was asked on Monday to guarantee that the Red Arrows’ next jet would not be designed by Russia.

“I can give you that guarantee – it’s very, very important that we don’t have Russian influence in Red Arrows or anything else for that matter,” said.

A spokesman for Starmer said there was no procurement plan in place to replace the Hawks.

Leonardo fought back, claiming, “The M-346 was designed, developed and produced in Europe to the most stringent NATO standards.” The Italian firm pointed out that pilots from around Europe, as well as the U.K., have already trained on the jet in Italy.

Aermacchi, the Italian jet trainer builder later purchased by Leonardo, racked up 300 flights while working on a prototype jet trainer with Russia’s Yakovlev.

But in 2000 the firms ended their collaboration when Yakovlev refused to consider using a U.S. Honeywell engine.

“There was a total disagreement – the Russians would not accept an American engine on a Russian military plane,” said Paolo Mezzanotte, who worked at Aermacchi at the time.

When the firms went their separate ways, Italy built the M-346 while Yakovlev built the Yak-130.

“The Russians went on to copy the Honeywell engine after the split, ironically producing it in Ukraine,” Mezzanotte said.

He said that the outside form of the two aircraft was similar, but the similarities stopped there.

“The manufacturing technology, the general systems, the mission systems, the propulsion and the flight control system on the M-346 is totally different. Italy did acquire the Yakovlev documentation about the plane but then redesigned it completely,” he said.

“Yakovlev had great engineers but their manufacturing at the time was at the level of Italian manufacturing in the 1950s,” he added.

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group is a summit of 50 countries that have met for the last three years to coordinate military aid for Kyiv.

Lloyd Austin, Hegseth’s predecessor, founded the group shortly after Russia’s 2022 invasion and chaired 25 meetings during the Biden administration. Since then, it’s raised more than $126 billion in security aid for Ukraine, around half of which has come from America.

Hegseth, like the Trump administration as a whole, has made arming Ukraine a lower priority while in office. He went to the group’s last meeting in February, but allowed Britain to chair it, the first time a U.S. secretary ceded that role.

While there, he urged Europe to take control of its own self-defense while previewing a less active role for America in protecting the continent.

The upcoming meeting will occur Friday in Brussels, chaired by Britain and Germany. European and American officials wondered whether Hegseth would join in the weeks prior, with some last week indicating he might skip it.

Even joining via teleconference is better than passing altogether, multiple European officials said. Still, they would have preferred him to attend in person and broadly remain unsure of America’s commitment to supporting Ukraine and European defense as a whole.

Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the head of European Command, will join the summit in person, though he will do so in his NATO role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Gen Curtis Buzzard, the head of a separate security assistance group for Ukraine, will also attend.

“We can’t have prosperity without security. That’s why we’re [doubling] defense spending to 2% of GDP over the next eight years,” Prime Minister Christopher Luxon posted on X after the country’s long-awaited Defence Capability Plan (DCP) was released April 7.

The document says the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) needs to be able to project force to deter adversaries.

“While the initial investment will be focused on selecting the first asset/s (ships, planes, or vehicles) to be equipped with missiles, future refreshes will consider expanding this to other assets, potentially delivering long range strike from multiple domains,” the plan reads.

The 48-page document describes investment options out to 2040 for a beleaguered NZDF that lacks personnel, has inadequate accommodation, a naval base troubled by silt, air bases with corroded runways and taxiways — and three warships without sailors.

There will be a planned commitment within the next four years of NZ$12 billion (US$ 6.6 billion) in capability and enablers. Progress will be reviewed every two years, officials said.

“Just because we’re small doesn’t mean we’re insignificant,” said Minister of Defence Judith Collins. “We’re a maritime nation.”

Political and public interest in naval affairs was accentuated in February by the presence of a Chinese naval flotilla, including a 439-foot frigate, a 586-foot replenishment vessel and a 591-foot cruiser in the Tasman Sea.

Their voyage around Australia included an unexpected live-firing exercise which led commercial flights between New Zealand and Australia to be diverted. However, Luxon says the DCP is not targeted at any particular country and there is no change to the country’s anti-nuclear policy.

The current NZDF workforce consists of approximately 8,700 Regular Force personnel, 3,300 reserves and 3,000 civilians. “While the exact growth will be determined by in-depth analysis as capabilities are developed, it is estimated that to support the delivery of this plan, by 2040 NZDF will have grown by around 2,500 people,” the plan reads.

“Up to NZ$1 billion plus” will be spent before 2029 on improving housing and real estate, the document adds.

In the same period the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s (RNZAF’s) two Boeing 757s will be replaced, at up to $NZ1 billion; the Army’s Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) will get new turrets and more than NZ$1 billion will be spent on “Enterprise Resource Planning.”

The military will buy new drones, both aerial and sea-going, and stock up on Javelin anti-tank missiles.

Sustaining the Royal New Zealand Navy’s two Anzac-class frigates, 26 and 28 years old, respectively, will cost up to NZ$600 million over the next four years; replacing their Kaman SH-2G(I) Seasprite helicopters is estimated at more than NZ$2 billion, officials here project.

In the decade to 2039, the NZDF “will look at” replacing weapon systems, including 105mm light guns (in service since the late 80s), the LAVs and the Army’s heavier vehicles, upgrades for the recently introduced C-130J-30 Hercules and the establishment of an Information Warfare Academy.

The NH90 and A109 helicopter fleets may be increased, updated or replaced, and the P-8As will be upgraded. Increased attention will be given both to acquiring drones and defending against them, the plan envisions.

“New Zealand will seek to procure the same assets and equipment as Australia where it makes sense to do so. This will help interoperability,” the document reads.

Rheinmetall plans to convert production at Hagedorn-NC to military-grade cellulose in coming months, though existing civilian customers will continue to be supplied “for the time being,” it said in a statement on Monday.

The purchase closes a strategic shortage in the supply chain, the company said.

“The acquisition helps us to overcome a strategic bottleneck in propellant production,” Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger said. “It gives us an important source of raw materials and continues the vertical integration along the entire value chain in the production of ammunition.”

Europe’s artillery ammunition makers have scrambled to boost output after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, with industry and the European Union jointly spending more than €1.5 billion ($1.6 billion) to add capacity for explosives, propellant and shells. The EU now expects the bloc to produce 2 million artillery shells in 2025, from estimated annual capacity of 230,000 rounds in early 2023.

Firing all those shells relies on nitrocellulose, which is the raw material for the charges that can propel a 155 mm grenade from a modern howitzer to distances of 40 kilometers (25 miles) or more. Gunners typically use modular charges, stacking more propellant to fire greater distances.

Rheinmetall is among those that has been ramping up production of large-caliber ammunition, and the company aims for capacity to produce up to 1.1 million 155 mm artillery shells annually by 2027. Hagedorn-NC will give Rheinmetall a fourth nitrocellulose production site, in addition to factories in Switzerland, Spain and South Africa, the company said.

The purchase comes after Prague-based defense firm Czechoslovak Group (CSG) in November snapped up the nitrocellulose business of U.S.-based International Flavors & Fragrances in Walsrode, Germany. The Czech firm plans to add production of nitrocellulose for ammunition over time, in addition to industrial applications such as wood coatings and nail polish.

Nitrocellulose is produced from either cotton linters or wood pulp, using nitrating acids to convert cellulose. The EU has banned export of nitrocellulose to Russia since April 2022, and of its precursor cotton linter pulp since June 2023.

The Hagedorn-NC acquisition is subject to antitrust approval, Rheinmetall said. The company said the purchase will strengthen its position as a leading supplier of large-caliber ammunition within NATO and ensure long-term and independent supply of essential components.

Rheinmetall didn’t immediately respond to e-mailed questions regarding financial details, production capacity and any remaining bottleneck issues in nitrocellulose.

The company says its acquisition of Hagedorn-NC will add 90 employees. Meanwhile, CSG said more than 350 people work in the Walsrode nitrocellulose plant and associated industrial park the company is buying.

New or additional production capacity for explosives and artillery propellant is arising or being planned across Europe, after Ukraine’s shell shortage in its fight against Russia and NATO’s inability to deliver enough ammunition raised the alarm for military planners and policymakers.

France last month restarted explosive powder production at Eurenco in Bergerac, in the southwest of the country, having halted domestic manufacture of propellant in 2007. Meanwhile, Denmark in March picked Norway’s Nammo to restart an ammunition plant that had been shut down in 2020.

Polish lawmakers in November agreed to invest around 3 billion zloty ($760 million) in local ammunition production, particularly of 155 mm shells. The government signed a letter of intent with fertilizer maker Grupa Azoty and defense manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa earlier that month to set up nitrocellulose and propellant production in Poland.

Rheinmetall currently makes nitrocellulose through the Nitrochemie joint venture with RUAG MRO Holding at a site in Wimmis, Switzerland, as well as at sites in Murcia in Spain and Welllington in South Africa.

Hagedorn-NC is based on Osnabrück in northwest Germany, with a production site in Lingen, and currently makes nitrocellulose specifically for industrial applications, particularly lacquers and printing inks.

The 155 mm howitzers will equip a new artillery battalion within the planned Finnmark brigade being set up to bolster Norway’s defenses in the high north, according to a government proposal published on Friday. The purchase plan is part of 17 billion kroner in proposed spending that also includes more sea mine-clearing capability, new military trucks and spending on facilities.

Norway already has 28 tracked K9 howitzers as well as 14 K10 ammunition resupply vehicles, and will exercise an option in its contract with Hanwha for the additional purchase, the government said. The spending plan still needs to be approved by the Norwegian parliament, the Storting.

“We are in a serious security policy situation,” Minister of Defence Tore Sandvik said. “Therefore, we will now ask the Storting to approve significant investments in various parts of the Armed Forces to strengthen Norway’s defense capability, in line with the ambitions of the long-term plan presented last year.”

The Norwegian government in October last year proposed to raise the country’s 2025 defense budget by 19.2 billion kroner to 110.1 billion kroner. The budget for the additional howitzers includes the guns as well as spare parts, according to the spending proposal.

The acquisition of additional artillery pieces “will contribute to significantly strengthening the Army’s firepower,” the government said.

The extra howitzers increase the total budget for the Norwegian 155 mm artillery project to 11.1 billion kroner, according to the government proposal. Other K9 operators in the Baltic region are Poland, Finland and Estonia.

The government also plans to spend an additional 3.9 billion kroner on maritime mine countermeasures, increasing the total budget for that project to 8.74 billion kroner. The plan for the Norwegian Navy’s future mine-clearing capability, first approved in 2023, will include unmanned and autonomous systems.

The previously approved mine countermeasures capability was assessed as too small in relation to the operational needs of a new security situation, according to the government. Expanding the scope of the project will ensure sufficient resources to safeguard “freedom of movement in Norwegian waters even in a crisis or war,” the government said.

“This will help to ensure that our own vessels and allies can sail safely and freely in Norwegian waters,” Sandvik said. “In addition, it can help to secure critical underwater infrastructure.”

The pitch: Europe wants to redouble its efforts to make steel “green” – producing the key ingredients for tanks, shells and ships in an environmentally conscious way.

The European Steel and Metals Action Plan, released on March 19, represents Brussels’ most comprehensive strategy yet to shore up an industry facing multiple existential threats: Chinese overcapacity, crippling energy costs, and the looming shadow of new American tariffs — all while fostering its transformation to climate neutrality.

The steel industry is one of the largest producers of greenhouse gases globally, responsible for roughly a tenth of total CO2 emissions. This is because it takes immense amounts of heat and, by extension, energy to melt the metal in blast furnaces.

But with European rearmament en vogue and free international trade out of fashion, the continent is set to experience a boom in demand for steel as a key ingredient in its buildup of its armed forces.

A strategic shift

The plan’s linking of industrial policy to defense readiness represents a significant shift in how Brussels frames its economic priorities. Commission officials explicitly linked the question of steel production to defense readiness amid rising tensions with Russia and uncertainty about long-term American security guarantees.

The European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, serves as the executive branch of the European Union. It was the commission that floated the ambitious plan to rearm Europe, which promises to see Europe mobilize close to a trillion dollars for its defense sector in the next five years. Just days after that plan was announced, the EU followed up with its ambitious metals plan.

The EU, at its core, was built on steel, growing out of the European Coal and Steel Community established in the aftermath of World War 2. And indeed, domestic production still covers 90% of the continent’s current consumption, the European Commission said. The situation is “more worrying,” in the EU’s words, for aluminum and nickel, where domestic production covers only 46% and 25% of Europe’s demand, respectively.

“All these metals are essential for defense,” the EU’s paper reads. It goes on to list out the requirements for specific armaments: “A main battle tank contains 50 to 60 tonnes of high-quality steel; a self-propelled artillery system up to 100 tonnes; a fighter aircraft 3 tonnes of aluminium.”

A new start

Europe’s metals industry has been squeezed from multiple directions. Energy costs following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have skyrocketed, with European producers paying up to five times more for gas and three times more for electricity than their American counterparts, the European Commission conceded in its report. Meanwhile, imports from Asia have nearly tripled over the past decade, with every third ton of steel in the EU now coming from elsewhere.

“The foreign trade policy proposals are a step in the right direction,” said Kerstin Maria Rippel, CEO of Germany’s Steel Industry Association. She said that it “is only logical in view of the increasing import pressure and the consequences of the confrontational U.S. trade policy.”

The EU’s six-pillar action plan hopes to alleviate some of the other ailments, too, by addressing energy costs, carbon leakage prevention, industrial capacity protection, metal recycling, job protection, and providing investment support in addition to protectionism.

Most notably, it includes a plan for a €100 billion ($108 billion) Industrial Decarbonisation Bank and a €1 billion pilot auction in 2025 aimed at electrification and low-carbon steel production.

It places “green steel” firmly at the heart of the European metals strategy. Using electrical furnaces and hydrogen, the emissions from the steel industry can be cut by as much as 95%. When burning hydrogen instead of coal or gas, the byproduct produced is water steam rather than CO2.

European steel producers have generally welcomed the plan. It demonstrates “understanding of the urgency surrounding the situation and a readiness to address key structural challenges,” praised Aditya Mittal, the CEO of ArcelorMittal, Europe’s largest steel producer. And the European Steel Association’s president, Henrik Adam, echoed the sentiment, saying that “the European Commission is sending a clear message: a strong European Union needs a strong European steel industry.”

However, both executives stressed that energy costs remain “the elephant in the room,” with Adam noting they are “dragging down entire European industrial value chains.”

Greener pastures

Electricity costs, for instance, stubbornly hover at double or four times the price of other steelmaking locations. With the transition to electric arc furnaces, electricity consumption is expected to roughly double, industry associations say, further magnifying a cost disadvantage.

Nonetheless, electricity and producing renewable hydrogen may be a more suitable way forward for Europe than relying on old methods. Gas is used during pig iron production in blast furnaces, which account for about 60% of EU steel production but has been a sticking point since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. During the 2022 energy crisis, energy costs reached 80% of total production costs for European steel producers.

While fossil fuel deposits cannot be conjured from thin air, renewable energy is seen by some as the solution to the continent’s energy woes, with solar, hydro and wind power available in ample quantities and ready for additional exploitation.

The third age of nuclear, still in its infancy, may play a role, too. Poland, for example, is progressing in its plans to build the country’s first nuclear power plant, with a final contract to be concluded this year. Nuclear power, while not strictly renewable, does not emit any harmful gases because no fuel is burnt. The electricity from these environmentally conscious sources can then be used to either power electric arc furnaces directly, or to split water to produce “green hydrogen,” the theory goes.

Russia’s invasion of its smaller neighbor Ukraine has brought to the fore the importance of energy resilience for the European Union. The European Defence Fund – an EU mechanism to support research and development with military applications – specifically designed this field as a “priority area” for defense investment in its 2025 work program.

The Union has called climate change “a priority for the EU’s security and defense policies” for years. It goes well beyond simply weaning the bloc off of foreign sources of gas. EU bodies warn that rising temperatures will have knock-on effects on security as societies struggle to adapt to a growing water scarcity and lower agricultural output.

The European Union’s diplomatic branch, the External Action Service, believes that “this will increasingly undermine peace and security, especially in fragile countries.” The EU estimates that 5.5% of global CO2 emissions may stem from the defense industry.

Global companies offered weaponry to that end at the recent Avalon International Airshow, held near Melbourne in late March.

For now it appears that military leaders are prizing sensors over interceptors in what will be Australia’s future network of weapons for defending would-be targets in a conflict.

Air Vice-Marshal Nick Hogan, head of Air Force Capability, acknowledged that an integrated, medium-range air defense capability has been delayed.

“What’s most important to us is seeing and sensing first, so getting the command and control right first, and then getting the kinetics that might be required to effect anything coming towards us,” he told Defense News at the Avalon event.

Hogan was referring primarily to Project Air 6500, which is slowly delivering an integrated air battle management system.

One lesson from Ukraine is the need for air defense, and Hogan said Australia was learning from evolutions seen globally. However, Australia currently owns only NASAMS batteries and three air-warfare destroyers.

While major Australian cities and military bases are often on coasts, there are simply not enough ships to protect them all. Furthermore, it is likely the U.S. will demand an air defense umbrella to protect a nuclear submarine base being established in Western Australia.

The Defence Strategic Review of 2023 urged acceleration of medium-range and high-speed missile defenses, with authors lamenting the low priority placed on integrated air and missile defense.

Instead of “pursuing a long-term, near-perfect solution at unaffordable cost,” the review said the government must allocate “sufficient resources to the Chief of Air Force to deliver the initial capability in a timely way”.

According to Hogan, ground-based defenses may not be the ideal solution for Australia.

“When you have a limited inventory, you want to be able to be as flexible as possible, so that might be using maritime stocks on land, it might be using land stocks in the maritime domain,” he said. “There are many options to go forward. What we’re trying to do is make sure, where possible, we can get the biggest return on investment using sovereign capabilities.”

Asked about a timeline for implementation, Hogan said: “As soon as we can practically make it happen.”

Potential solutions, such as Raytheon’s Patriot and systems from Israel and South Korea, were being promoted at Avalon Airshow 2025.

Officials have also begun addressing an Australian weakness in countering drones, albeit at a limited level.

Last year, Anduril Australia signed a three-year deal to trial a counter-drone capability at RAAF Base Darwin in the north, but this is an isolated step forward.

Nonetheless, Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, Chief of Air Force, said: “We’re investing in our northern base infrastructure,” including “the ability to passively defend, use deception, be able to recover, be able to agilely move forces around”.

Hardened aircraft shelters are no longer part of the equation.

“That was a fantastic concept for its day, but probably its day has passed,” Chappell said.

“We’re already working with our civilian sector and our industry sectors in the northern half of Australia using non-military airfields to land, refuel and, in the future, rearm, combat aircraft or other aircraft in order to regenerate airpower from non-military bases.”

A recent report by the U.S.-based Hudson Institute think tank assessed that as few as ten missiles, each with a warhead spraying cluster munitions over a 450-foot diameter, could neutralize all aircraft parked in the open at various key U.S. bases. Australia’s situation is no different. Likewise, loitering munitions could easily penetrate regular aircraft shelters.

Air Vice-Marshal Glen Braz, Air Commander Australia, argued the air service is “very deliberate about our passive efforts” to protect bases.

“As threats evolve, and warfare evolves, we’d seek to have layers of defense systems that we’d want to have in place,” Braz said. “But we’re very much training our teams to fight the network of bases as a system.”

Meanwhile, officials used the the Avalon airshow to provide an assessment of key aerial platforms in the pipeline.

They had good things to say about the influx of F-35s, the fifth-generation warplane made by Lockheed Martin.

“We had the last nine aircraft arrive in December, so we’re thrilled to have our 72 F-35s with us in Australia across our three operational squadrons, the training unit and integrated training center,” Chappell told Defense News.

Elsewhere, the RAAF continues testing of Boeing Defence Australia’s MQ-28A Ghost Bat unmanned aircraft. Hogan said he is “very pleased” with progress.

“This year we’re going to demonstrate the capabilities of the platform over a number of activities,” Hogan said. “We’ll test all of the payloads we’ve planned for potential use on the platform, with the exception of it being armed. That’s one that remains in our thinking, but we’re going to focus on other payloads first.”

Competition for the Ghost Bat is brewing under Project Air 6015, where the RAAF will make recommendations to government on the way forward for collaborative combat aircraft, probably by year’s end.

Hogan said the MQ-28A will be a “very strong contender in any options we take forward to government.”

Regardless, Anduril believes its YFQ-44A Fury stands a chance. The American company displayed a full-sized model of the aircraft at the Avalon show.

The Ministry of Defense indicated in a news release April 1 that the contract is part of plans to boost standoff missile capabilities as the Asian nation faces multiple regional threats.

The contract with MHI to develop new ground-to-ground and ground-to-ship precision-guided missiles will last until 2028. The ministry expects the new missiles to be completed in 2032.

The missiles will be used to “prevent and eliminate invading troops,” the Ministry of Defense said.

The ministry has not released any additional information about the missiles but included in the press release a few diagrams showing its expected capabilities.

The long-range missiles could target vulnerable parts of ships and traverse Japan’s mountainous terrains to hit land-based targets with “particularly high accuracy.”

Since 2022, Japan has been beefing up its capabilities as part of its “three white papers,” the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Plan.

Japan has allocated approximately 939 billion yen for standoff defense capabilities. The budget includes allocations for Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles (16.8 billion yen, or $112.6 million); submarine-launched guided missiles (3 billion yen, or $20.1 million); and high-velocity gliding missiles for island defense (29.3 billion yen, or $160.2 million).

The Asian nation also plans to acquire joint strike missiles to be installed on its F-35As and joint air-to-surface stand-off missile for its upgraded F-15 aircraft.

Last year, Japan signed a deal to purchase 400 additional Tomahawk missiles from the United States and declared plans to deploy a year earlier than planned some Tomahawks and Type 12 surface-to-ship truck-mounted missiles this year.

Earlier this week, the country’s defense ministry also announced its latest missile co-production project with the U.S. to develop AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles during U.S. defense secretary Pete Hegseth’s visit to Japan.

During the visit, Hegseth called Japan “an indispensable partner in deterring Communist Chinese military aggression.”

Defense Minister Nikos Dendias told parliament the overhaul will be built around a planned air defense system called “Achilles Shield,” primarily aimed at addressing tensions with neighboring Turkey.

The two NATO members have long-standing disputes over boundaries in the Aegean Sea and eastern Mediterranean that have brought them close to war several times in recent decades.

Dendias said Greece plans to shift from traditional defense systems to a high-tech, networked strategy centered on mobile, AI-powered missile systems, drone technologies and advanced command units — reducing reliance on conventional fleets.

The plan also includes new programs such as next-generation soldier gear equipped with sensors and communication systems, and the development of dedicated satellite capabilities to ensure secure communications during conflict.

“What we are proposing is an existential issue for the country — a complete shift in our defense approach, a total change in doctrine,” Dendias said. “We’re moving away from the traditional thinking that the Aegean is defended solely by the fleet.”

The overhaul, which will be presented to lawmakers behind closed doors in the coming weeks, also involves greater inclusion of local tech start-ups and a major personnel reorganization – merging units, closing underused bases and addressing a top-heavy command structure.

The initiative comes as European countries ramp up military spending in response to the ongoing war in Ukraine and indications that the Trump administration wants to reduce the United States’ commitment to European defense.

Greece’s modernization drive — launched after years of defense cuts during the 2010–2018 financial crisis — already includes all branches of the armed forces and focuses on cooperation with France, Israel, and the United States. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met in Israel on Sunday with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior Israeli defense officials. On Wednesday, Mitsotakis dismissed calls by some opposition parties to abandon plans to buy U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets in favor of a European alternative, describing the program as an important “long-term investment.”

The group will meet April 11 in Brussels and will be chaired by Germany and Britain. Hegseth attended the last meeting in February, though he became the first U.S. defense secretary in the coalition’s 26 meetings not to lead it.

Hegseth won’t join in person and isn’t expected to join virtually either, according to a U.S. official, who like others was granted anonymity to discuss the planning. In fact, the Pentagon is unlikely to send any senior representatives, which typically join the secretary on such trips.

The United States is still assessing how its officials will participate in the various forums that support Ukraine, including those that help manage security assistance and training, the U.S. official said.

For Europeans, the secretary’s absence is the latest sign of the Trump administration’s lower-priority approach to arming Ukraine — a point Hegseth made clear at the last meeting in February.

In a speech from Brussels, Hegseth scolded European officials, urging them to take more control of their own defense rather than relying on America’s 75-year role helping defend the continent. He also ruled out the possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine before the administration had itself made a decision on the topic — something the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, R-Miss., called a “rookie mistake.”

“President [Donald] Trump will not allow anyone to turn Uncle Sam into Uncle Sucker,” Hegseth said, referring to a quote from former president Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Hegseth’s predecessor, Lloyd Austin, founded the Ukraine Defense Contact Group shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Since then, the group has helped raise and coordinate more than $126 billion in security aid to Ukraine, around half of which has come from America.

In the three years since, the group became synonymous both with Ramstein Air Base, where it was founded, and U.S. leadership. The only time Austin did not attend one of the group’s in-person meetings was early 2024, when he was recovering from complications following cancer treatment. Instead, he called into the summit and had Celeste Wallander, a top Pentagon policy official, convene the group.

Sensing the U.S. may step back from its role, European officials were already planning for alternate formats when the group last gathered during the Biden administration, Wallander said in an interview. One of the arrangements discussed was for Germany and the United Kingdom to take the lead, representing Europe’s economic powerhouse and one of its most capable militaries.

While the Ukraine group could continue meeting without U.S. leadership, Wallander said, there would be real costs. American defense officials, along with military counterparts from U.S. European Command, have typically led briefings on the state of the war and how it relates to Ukraine’s battlefield needs.

Without them, the group would lack key U.S. intelligence, something European officials are already preparing for. In late February, after a disastrous visit to the Oval office by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the U.S. stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine and paused weapons deliveries for a week.

The Pentagon has $3.85 billion left in authority to send Ukraine military equipment, but no money left to replace it. Leaders in Congress have said they have no plans to pass more.

The official notice of the sale follows U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s trip to the Philippines last week, and it comes ahead of the annual Balikatan exercises, a joint military drill between the long-time treaty allies.

Hegseth’s visit came amid the U.S.’s growing tension with China and as part of what experts and geopolitical watchers describe as Washington’s pivot to Asia. During the visit, Hegseth said Washington plans to “re-establish deterrence” and strengthen its allies in the region.

The proposed aircraft sale to the Philippines will be “helping to improve the security of a strategic partner that continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in Southeast Asia,” the Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated.

The package includes 16 F-16C Block 70/72 aircraft and 4 F-16D Block 70/72 aircraft, which will be fully equipped with 88 LAU-129 guided missile launchers, 22 M61A1 anti-craft guns with 20 installed upon delivery, 12 AN/AAQ-33 sniper advanced targeting pods, radio systems, AESA radars, and navigational devices.

The package also includes: 112 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) or AIM-120C-8 or equivalent missiles; 36 guided bomb units; 40 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles with 32 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs); 60 MK-84 2,000-lb general-purpose bombs; and 30 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) KMU-572 tail kits for GBU-38 or Laser JDAM GBU-54.

The State Department indicated that offset agreements will be “defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.”

Lockheed Martin is the principal contractor for the package.

The Philippines has had no frontline fighter jets since it retired its fleet of Northrop F-5 A/Bs in 2005. Negotiations to refresh its fleet hark back to the 1990s, but negotiations did not materialize.

In 2021, the State Department approved the sale of 10 F-16C Block 70/72 and 2 F-16D Block 70/72 aircraft in a $2.43 billion package which did not come through as the Philippines had only earmarked $1.1 billion for the acquisition.

Last year, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said the country plans to acquire 40 fighter jets as part of the new Horizon 3, the final phase in a massive push to modernize the military.

President Ferdinand Marcos approved the new Horizon 3 under a 1.89 trillion pesos ($33.6 billion) budget, which will be subject to congressional approval in the next ten years.

Also during last year’s budget deliberations, Teodoro told reporters that the department solicits offers with flexible and spread-out financing terms for the 40 jets, adding the military is allotting as much as 400 billion pesos ($6.9 billion) for the acquisition.

The Philippine government has yet to decide on its chosen fighter jets, which is expected to boost its Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, an external defense strategy to protect Philippine territories including its exclusive economic zones in what the Philippine government calls the West Philippine Sea.

Lecornu will also ask the European Commission to speed up deployment and increase the budget for the IRIS² sovereign satellite constellation, the French minister said in a press briefing with his Danish counterpart, Troels Lund Poulsen, in Paris on Tuesday afternoon.

The defense ministers are meeting on April 2 and 3 to discuss a white paper on the future of European defense, developing and financing defense capabilities within the 27-nation bloc, and military support for Ukraine. Lecornu said policymakers need to move on to concrete measures to build up Europe’s defense industry.

“We have to stop with the big speeches, we have to stop with the packages of billions where we don’t always know exactly how it works,” Lecornu said. “We need things that are sometimes perhaps more modest, but very effective.”

The EU’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production “worked, we are therefore calling for a new edition of an ASAP-type facility,” according to Lecornu. The European Commission allocated €500 million ($540 million) through the program to boost ammo output, and now forecasts the bloc will produce 2 million artillery shells this year, from an estimated annual capacity of 230,000 rounds in early 2023.

A new ammo program should cover both simple and complicated munitions, including missiles, the French minister said. EU aid could help in a hypothetical scenario where missile maker MBDA sets up licensed production in European countries by adding to corporate financing and purchases by the host country, according to Lecornu.

France has support from other EU members to ask the Commission to speed up the IRIS² plan for a sovereign European satellite constellation, Lecornu said, declining to name the countries. The project is key to European strategic autonomy and is progressing, but has “an enormous challenge in terms of execution time,” the minister said.

The consortium picked to deploy the satellite constellation, led by SES, Eutelsat and Hispasat, is targeting full operational status for the early 2030s, pushing back IRIS² by several years compared to an EU timetable in March 2023 that envisaged full service in 2027.

“It’s an issue on which the commission is obviously eagerly awaited and on which we’d like to help,” Lecornu said. “It’s about money because it’s about speeding up, and money means speeding up. It may also be about simplifying the organization, the very governance of IRIS².”

“It makes sense, because we don’t have a solution, we don’t have a plan B, it’s either that or Starlink,” Lecornu said, referring to the satellite constellation operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX.

“The problem is, we have industrial time that is sometimes decorrelated from diplomatic time,” Lecornu said. “I’m trying to reduce diplomatic time, because there are still people making noise and doing complicated things, when in fact there are industrial opportunities.”

Denmark formalized the purchase of French Mistral short-range air defense missiles in Paris, and “we can do even more together,” Lund Poulsen said. “I hope also that it will be possible to make further announcements in the coming month about new procurements in France. I think the French defense companies have a lot to offer.”

The Danish government in February agreed to allocate an additional 50 billion kroner ($7.2 billion) to defense over the coming two years, boosting defense spending to more than 3% of GDP in 2025 and 2026.

The Nordic nation is looking to rebuild an air-defense bubble after decommissioning its Hawk missile systems in 2005. Denmark last month shortlisted the French-Italian SAMP/T and the U.S. Patriot air-defense batteries to cover the high end of the threat spectrum in its planned purchase, while MBDA France’s VL MICA system, Kongsberg’s NASAMS, the IRIS-T SLM from Germany’s Diehl Defence and the U.S. IFPC. are in competition for the lower end.

“We are in Denmark very concerned about the situation with the land-based air-defense system, because we don’t have any,” Lund Poulsen said. He expects the government will be able to make a decision “before summer.”

“I’m very happy that France also today have told me directly that they will be willing to collaborate with Denmark in that context,” the Danish minister said. “We have to see the offers that will come in, but let me just underline that it is of our interest also to have a decision before summer.”

Buying SAMP/T would make Denmark the first export customer in the EU for the long-range air-defense system, with France and Italy currently the only users in the 27-nation bloc. Ukraine uses a donated SAMP/T system to defend the Kyiv area, while Singapore is the only other export user following a purchase in 2013.

Meanwhile, Lund Poelsen commented on the American military presence in Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, where the U.S. operates Pituffik Space Base. U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to annex Greenland, citing security needs.

“Denmark has a long-lasting good relationship with the U.S., also about the security in Greenland,” the minister said. He said Denmark has an agreement from 1951 about the U.S. presence in the territory. “So if the U.S. would like to have more bases in Greenland, it is possible for them to raise that question to the Danish government. And will they be doing that? We’ll be willing to discuss that.”

The decision comes shortly after Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland said they were assessing the possibility of exiting the treaty, which would allow them to stockpile and use landmines to secure their respective borders with Russia.

“Finland will prepare for the withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention – the decision is based on a thorough assessment by the relevant ministries and the Defense Forces,” Stubb said in a statement published on X, formerly Twitter.

Finland shares a 1,340 kilometer border with Russia, the longest of any alliance member country.

The convention, which was formalized almost three decades ago, has 133 signatories and 165 parties, according to the latest available data from the United Nations. However, countries such as Russia, Belarus, the United States and China have never ratified it.

Moscow has made extensive use of anti-personnel mines in Ukraine, with the UN reporting that Ukraine had become the most mined country in the world last year, with “hundreds of thousands of explosive remnants of war.”

The Ukraine war has highlighted the double-edge sword that landmines represent in military operations. Despite the long-term dangers that unexploded ordnance poses to civilians, the weapons have allowed Ukrainian troops to effectively defend themselves and their territory against Russian aggression.

It appears to be these defensive advantages that European countries are after, according to the Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo.

“Withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention will give us the possibility to prepare for the changes in the security environment in a more versatile way,” he said during a press conference on April 1.

Finland also committed to raising its defense expenditure to 3% of its gross domestic product by 2029, according to Stubb.

Meanwhile, plans to upgrade the U.K.’s Challenger main battle tank have been impacted by some delays in the supply chain, with additional resources being channeled into the program to resolve the issues, Eagle said in a response on April 1.

The British government in its Spring Statement in March announced plans to spend at least 10% of the Ministry of Defence equipment budget on new technologies such as drones and AI-enabled capabilities, and create a ring-fenced budget of £400 million ($516 million) for a defense-innovation fund.

“We are bringing laser technology to the Navy around five years faster than previously planned, which will protect our Armed Forces, and let us learn by doing,” Eagle said. “As announced in the Spring Statement, additional funding for Defence will be directed toward advancing technology including guaranteeing the in service date for DragonFire.”

Turning DragonFire into an operational capability more quickly will allow the armed forces to make continual improvements in areas like integration, software and overall lethality, the minister said. That will help develop the system itself, as well as inform the choices the MoD makes on future directed-energy weapons, according to Eagle.

DragonFire in January 2024 for the first time destroyed an aerial target with a high-powered test shot, in what the MoD called a major step forward in bringing the laser technology into service. The industry team developing the laser weapon is led by pan-European missile maker MBDA, with partners Leonardo UK and Qinetic.

The U.K. government plans to increase defense spending to 2.5% of GDP in 2027. That would translate into £14.2 billion additional spending in the 2027-2028 fiscal year compared with 2024-2025, based on the latest data from the Office for Budget Responsibility, more than the £13.4 billion announced in February, according to Eagle.

The U.K. spent an estimated £64.6 billion on defense in 2024, up from £61.9 billion a year earlier.

The ongoing plan to upgrade Britain’s main battle tank to the Challenger 3 version ran into some supply-chain hiccups, Eagle said. The upgraded tank’s initial operating capability is forecast for 2027, with all of the U.K.’s 138 Challenger 3 tanks planned to be in service by the end of 2030.

“Additional resources have been directed towards resolving these issues and the next phase of trials will start in quarter two 2025,” Eagle said. “Progress will be monitored carefully and any impact on the delivery of initial operating capability will be continually assessed.”

The upgrade is being led by Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land, with enhancements including a turret wit a 120mm smooth-bore gun, new armor and an active protection system. The approved budget for the upgrade is £1.9 billion, which includes the contract with RBSL, and there have been no increases to the total budget due to technical challenges or inflation, Eagle said.

“We are confident that Challenger 3 will continue to match potential threats throughout its lifecycle, but we will continually review the performance of its specification to ensure that it remains world-leading,” Eagle said.

Unlike during Trump’s first term in office, however, this time Europe has recognized the dramatic nature of the situation and developed ideas to strengthen the British and French nuclear deterrent. Both European nuclear powers want to intensify their nuclear consultations and, in addition, French President Emmanuelle Macron has once again called for a dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear states in Europe.

Germany is open to such a dialogue. The German British Defence Agreement (Trinity House), concluded in autumn 2024, already explicitly provides for an exchange on nuclear issues.

Friedrich Merz, Germany’s designated chancellor, also spoke out in favor of the nuclear dialogue proposed by Macron at an early stage. The idea of such talks is to send a signal of commitment and determination not only to Moscow, but also to Washington.

This is not (yet) about replacing the American “extended deterrent” with a European version as it is far from certain that Washington will close the nuclear umbrella over Europe, especially as the damage to the USA itself would be considerable.

The goal of nuclear non-proliferation, which America has always pursued, would be jeopardized and new nuclear states could emerge in Eastern Europe or Asia, for example.

However, the Trump administration is not known for taking the negative consequences of its own impulsive actions into account in advance.

What could Germany bring to such talks, and what would be its contribution to strengthening a European nuclear deterrent?

There’s certainly nothing along the lines of Germany attempting to develop its own nuclear weapons. Germany has repeatedly and formally renounced this option and, apart from a few academics, there is no politically serious voice in Berlin that would want to change this – not to mention the enormous costs of such a project.

Even the conceivable possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons on German soil – similar to the U.S. nuclear bombs in deployed in Germany – is currently only a theoretical one.

Paris has not yet abandoned its long-standing skepticism towards the idea of a nuclear umbrella for non-nuclear allies and sees nuclear weapons as a strictly national matter.

Furthermore, France only has around 40 nuclear cruise missiles and the same number of land-based, nuclear-capable Rafale fighter-bombers. The rest of the approximately 290 French nuclear warheads are intended for use at sea – either from submarines or with Rafale bombers from the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle.”

The British nuclear arsenal is stationed exclusively on submarines.

What Germany can offer London and Paris, however, is to contribute to the considerable costs of both countries’ nuclear capabilities.

Back in May 2017, the Scientific Service of the German Parliament analyzed the co-financing of foreign nuclear weapons potentials from the federal budget in a publicly accessible report.

This assessment was commissioned by parliamentarians because the question of the reliability of the American nuclear commitments had already arisen during President Trump’s first term in office.

The report concluded that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been binding for Germany since 1975, does not contain a ban on support or funding from non-nuclear states for nuclear powers. Nor can such a ban be derived from the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, in which Germany’s non-nuclear status is enshrined, or from general international law.

Only some international treaties on “nuclear-weapon-free zones” contain indirect prohibitions on assistance. However, Germany is not a party to such treaties.

Apparently, Germany has not yet provided such nuclear co-financing, even though there were occasional rumors that the Federal Republic had provided financial support for the development of Israel’s nuclear weapons potential in the 1950s and 1960s. However, such rumors have never been substantiated.

What follows from all this is that financial support for British or French nuclear deterrence is possible in principle. Of course, this would only take place if a direct link were established between the nuclear weapons potential of both countries and the security of Germany and Europe.

The corresponding benefits and counter-benefits would have to be set out in legally binding bilateral agreements. It is worth noting that the German Federal Ministry of Finance has already created a branch called “Geo-Economics and Security Policy” in order to assess the various financial implications of the new security challenges – this branch could conceptually assess the implications of such an agreement.

If Germany were to include such an option in the planned dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear states, the talks would immediately be elevated to a politically concrete and presumably mutually beneficial level. It would also be an example of a strategically forward-looking German security policy – something that has not often been the case in Berlin in the past.

Karl-Heinz Kamp is an associate fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations and was president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy.